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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
Shame is considered an influential human emotion that can have critical effects on aspects of 
human functioning, including guiding behaviour and shaping a person’s sense of identity. In 
order to better identify shame, it is vital to distinguish shame behaviours from those of other 
self-conscious emotions. The current study examined shame and the degree to which eye 
gaze diversion is associated with shame generally, or rather more isolated to either internal or 
external shame. Additionally, it explored whether experiences of dissociation would increase 
after the shame induction. Lastly, intrusive thoughts following shame induction were 
examined. Individuals in counselling for psychological problems (N = 33) completed four 
measures assessing trait and state shame and dissociation, and listened to shame-inducing and 
neutral narratives while either viewing themselves in a mirror (internal shame), looking at the 
experimenter (external shame) or looking at a neutral screen (neutral). Eye gaze diversion 
was recorded during the experimental task. Higher gaze diversion and dissociation were 
found when verbalising the shame narrative compared with the neutral narrative in all 
conditions. Additionally, intrusion frequency and distress were elevated the day after 
exposure to the stimuli, but decreased on day two. The current study has important 
implications for the identification of shame, and demonstrates that dissociation increases 
during shame activation. This understanding can provide direction for future research which 
may aid in the identification of further shame behaviours and could lead to better therapeutic 
outcomes when considered. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Shame has been described as “perhaps the most negative and disturbing emotional 
experience” (Keltner & Harker, 1998, p. 78). It commonly results from a situation in which 
an individual violates rules of a moral nature. Shame can guide our behaviours, influence our 
feelings about ourselves and shape a sense of self-identity (Matos & Pinto-Gouveia, 2010). It 
is thought that for some individuals shame can be an experience so intense that they may risk 
serious injury, even death, to avoid the experience (Gilbert, 1989). Clinical and empirical 
data suggests that early shame experiences might operate like traumatic autobiographical 
memories, increasing vulnerability to psychopathology (Claesson & Sohlberg, 2002; Gilbert, 
2002), such as; posttraumatic stress disorder, borderline personality (Matos & Pinto-Gouveia, 
2010), depression (Andrews, 1995) and dissociation (Dorahy, 2010). In fact, the nature of 
shame experiences is argued to share powerful characteristics with a traumatic memory, 
where the self feels fragmented and dissociated, and the feeling intrudes like a flashback 
(Matos & Pinto-Gouveia, 2010). Additionally, shame can impede active coping and can be 
difficult to modulate (Lewis, 1992; Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995). Dissociation may 
reflect a way of limiting shame through psychological means, therefore being regarded as a 
coping mechanism (Zeidner & Endler, 1996). As dissociation is poorly conceptualized, it 
may remain unrecognized and undetected in individuals, which can interfere with the 
treatment of specific mental health disorders if present. Therefore, dissociation may have a 
devastating impact on individual’s treatments, even more so if it is associated with shame, 
which can often be ignored in therapy (Hahn, 2009). 
The domain of shame, and in particular its relationship to dissociation, requires 
further exploration. The current study contributes to this exploration with simultaneous 
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investigation of different aspects of shame experiences. The aim of this thesis and the 
subsequent review is to elaborate on the fundamental features of both shame and dissociation, 
while integrating recent literature investigating their association. Specifically, this thesis 
looks at shame with regard to the non-verbal marker of eye gaze diversion, as well as 
examining whether or not symptoms of dissociation and physiological arousal occur during 
an induction of shame. Finally, shame will be examined as a traumatic experience by 
ascertaining whether shame inductions result in later intrusive memories in participants. The 
literature review will consider self-conscious emotions, explore the conceptualisation and 
motivation of shame, provide a comparison between internal- and external-based shame, and 
non-verbal behaviours associated with shame, specifically eye-gaze diversion. Furthermore, 
the conceptualisation of dissociation, and dissociative experiences will be explored (e.g., 
depersonalisation and derealisation, amnesia and absorption), with literature regarding shame 
as a traumatic memory and its association with dissociation presented. Finally the current 
study is described. 
1.2 Self-Conscious Emotions 
All emotions arise from events that in one way or another have relevance for oneself 
(Tangney & Tracy, 2011). Emotion can be broken into either basic or self-conscious, where 
basic consists of emotions such as sadness, fear and joy, which are present more or less from 
birth, while self-conscious includes emotions such as shame, embarrassment, pride or guilt, 
which develop early in life (Tracy & Robins, 2004a). Unlike basic emotions, which require 
little sense of self, the self-conscious emotions require a degree of self-awareness and involve 
comparison of one’s behaviour to standards and rules, thereby playing central roles in the 
socialization and adherence to moral and societal norms (Goffman, 1967; Lewis, 1993). 
Understanding self-conscious emotions is crucial in order to understand the self. Self-
conscious emotions are associated with complex cognitive skills, and therefore take more 
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time to develop than basic emotions such as sadness or fear (Weiner, 1986). Self-conscious 
emotions play a critical role in the motivation and regulation of feelings, thoughts and 
behaviours (Campos, 1995). These emotions, evoked by self-reflection and self-evaluation 
can be implicit or explicit in nature, and experienced consciously or outside awareness. Yet in 
some way these emotions essentially involve reactions to one’s own characteristics or 
behaviours (Tangney & Tracy, 2011). When good things happen, for example, it is possible 
one may feel a range of positive basic feelings, like joy and surprise. However, it is pride that 
is felt in our own positive characteristics or actions. As previous literature implies, self-
conscious emotions involve self-relevant thoughts, intentions, and feelings as well as 
behaviours (Fischer & Tangney, 1995; Campos, 1995). Hence, self-conscious emotions are 
important to a variety of social outcomes. Self-conscious emotions function together to 
provide immediate and relevant feedback on our moral and social acceptability (Tangney & 
Tracy, 2011), ultimately our worth as human beings. 
1.3 Shame 
1.3.1 Conceptualising Shame 
Shame is an emotional response that has been described as an aversive experience, in 
which an individual is motivated to avoid the reoccurrence similar experience (Gilbert & 
McGuire, 1998). This is because shame generally occurs as a result of incompetence or moral 
indiscretions in which the individual is left feeling demeaned, discredited, or disgraced. 
Essentially, shame is a strong and influential human emotion that has a critical effect on 
numerous aspects of an individual’s psychological functioning, including aspects such as 
cognition, behaviour, emotion, sense of self and physiology, as well as operating at the 
individual, interpersonal, group and cultural levels throughout one’s life (Gilbert, 1998; 
Kaufman, 1989; Lewis, 1992). In order to define shame it is vital to distinguish shame from 
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other emotions which are often used interchangeably, such as embarrassment and guilt. 
Throughout the literature there are several instances in which embarrassment has been used 
interchangeably with shame, due to the belief they are one and the same. Kaufman (1989), for 
example, theorised embarrassment to be an element of shame, stating “however mild or 
intense, embarrassment is not a different affect” (p. 24). With regard to their difference, 
shame, occurs when an “objectionable behaviour is seen as reflecting, more generally, a 
defective, objectionable self” (Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996, p. 1257). 
Conversely, embarrassment has been defined as “an aversive state of mortification, 
abashment and chagrin that follows public social predicaments” (Miller, 1995, p. 322). 
Shame is often assumed to be a more intense emotion than that of embarrassment (Tangney, 
Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996). Buss (1980) has suggested, along with others (such as 
Lewis, 1992; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988) that shame follows more serious failures and 
moral transgressions, whereas embarrassment results from comparatively trivial social 
transgressions. Thus suggesting the resulting emotion relies on situational factors. Buss 
(1980) cites additional differences between the two emotions, including embarrassment being 
more likely to be accompanied with blushing, smiling and feelings of foolishness, and less 
likely to involve feelings of depression. Buss (1980) also implies the root of these differences 
lies within the nature of the shame versus embarrassment-eliciting event, where "shame has 
moral implications, but embarrassment does not" (p. 161). Another differentiation that has 
been made relates to shame being tied to deficiencies in one’s core self, while embarrassment 
results from deficiencies within one’s presented self (Klass, 1990). As a result, shame has 
been associated with more global and enduring negative attributions about the self, whereas 
embarrassment is tied to more transient, situation-specific failures. Subsequently, shame is 
considered a grimmer, more intense emotion, resulting from moral transgressions, with ties to 
deficiencies in one’s core self. Whereas embarrassment, typically resulting from 
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transgressions of a trivial nature and deficiencies of one’s presented self, is accompanied by 
feelings of awkwardness and foolishness (Buss, 1980).  This indicates that shame is more 
aversive due to negative events being directly connected to one’s self identity, while 
embarrassment sits at a more superficial level and is suggested to be more transient. When an 
event occurs that impacts upon one’s core self it is likely that stronger subsequent emotions 
may be felt, which may indicate why the link between shame and further psychopathology 
has been found repeatedly. However, Crozier (2014) states that no consensus has been 
established on how shame and embarrassment differ, stating minimal consistency within 
literature. 
Guilt, like embarrassment, is another emotion often confused with shame. Once again, 
the defining concept is different to that of shame, with guilt being a negative self-evaluation 
of particular behaviours rather than a negative evaluation of the core self (Lewis, 1971). 
Some have argued that shame is a public emotion that results from public exposure and 
disapproval of an impropriety or shortcoming (Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996). 
Shame is also proposed to result from a private feeling linked to judgements of our own 
feelings and characteristics (Matos & Pinto-Gouveia, 2010), which gives a contrasting view 
than stated above. However, guilt is a more private emotion that follows on from an 
individual’s internalised conscience to a breach of personal standards, and as a result may be 
felt when one is alone. These ideas have been challenged in recent years (Tangney, Marshall, 
Rosenberg, Barlow & Wagner, 1994). In more recent studies when distinguishing between 
shame and guilt, most researchers in the field draw heavily on Lewis' (1971) influential 
reconceptualization. Wherein he stated that "the experience of shame is directly about the 
self, which is the focus of evaluation. In guilt, the self is not the central object of negative 
evaluation, but rather the thing done or undone is the focus. In guilt, the self is negatively 
evaluated in connection with something but is not itself the focus of the experience" (Lewis, 
7 
 
1971, p. 30). Specifically, it is not the nature of the transgression which matters, rather the 
subjective interpretation of the event taken by the individual; placing an emphasis on a bad 
self in regards to shame (“I did that horrible thing”) or a bad behavior pertaining to guilt (“I 
did that horrible thing”). Guilt may therefore be a less intense emotion than shame as the 
individual has a negative evaluation of what they did rather than a negative evaluation of who 
they are. 
1.3.2 Motivations of Shame 
It has been proposed that shame first arises from interactions with significant others 
early on in life, however it develops later than primary emotions, such as anger, fear and joy. 
This is proposed due to shame being dependent on the initial development of certain mental 
abilities that include a degree of self-awareness, a fundamental theory of mind, and an ability 
to imagine one’s self as thought about by others (Gilbert, 2002; Gilbert, 2003). It is when 
these self-conscious competencies for a sense of self as a social agent develop and combine 
with primary emotions that the self-conscious emotions are thought to arise. It is due to these 
self-conscious competencies merging with primary emotions that shame is experienced. For 
example, when someone experiences shame they may feel anxious, whereas another may feel 
anger. Shame can impede active coping and can be difficult to modulate (Lewis, 1992; 
Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995). Evidence now suggests that shame can act as an inner 
warning signal for challenges and threats to the self, in turn triggering one’s automatic 
defences, specifically the desire to escape or behavioural submission (Keltner & Harker, 
1998). The shame response also acts through reducing facial communication with others 
(Tomkins, 1963). Nathanson (1992) proposes shame is a vital regulator of social behaviour in 
humans. As a way to illustrate the various ways humans react when experiencing shame 
Nathanson (1992) developed ‘the compass of shame’. The four poles of the compass of 
shame comprise withdrawal (isolating oneself, running and hiding), attacking self (self-put-
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down and masochism), avoidance (denial, abusing drugs and distraction through thrill 
seeking) and attacking others (turning the tables, lashing out verbally or physically and 
blaming others). Nevertheless we all react to shame in differing degrees, in ways described 
by the compass. 
There are theorists (e.g. Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1984; Izard, 1971) who believe 
emotion displays, including shame, in the course of human evolution have been refined to 
serve informative, influential and evocative functions that coordinate adaptive social 
behaviours (Keltner & Harker, 1998). These displays of emotion provide quick, dependable 
and easily recognised signals of current emotion (Ekman, 1984). It is the informative, 
influential and evocative functions of shame displays that play a critical role in the 
appeasement process (Keltner & Harker, 1998). Wherein, it has been proposed that shame 
and related states, such as embarrassment and guilt, serve the important function of appeasing 
observers of social transgressions, which allows social harmony to be re-established 
following the rule violations that may cause the disruption in social interaction (Keltner, 
1995; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Miller & Leary, 1992). Appeasement displays are used to 
signal lower status and submissiveness, which deters observers from punitive judgment and 
action (Castelfranchi & Poggi, 1990). MacLean (1990) boldly went as far as stating that 
appeasing submissive displays are ‘‘the most important of all displays, because without 
[them] numerous individuals might not survive’’ (p. 235). This aligns with the idea that 
appeasement is an essential function for survival of interpersonal relationships, and the 
maintenance of one’s place in a social group (e.g., avoiding social rejection). What is central 
to shame, is that the affected individual sees themselves to be in an unwanted inferior 
psychological state, is concerned of the opinions of others (e.g., being looked down upon), 
and tends towards adopting non-assertive and submissive defensive behaviours (Gilbert, Pehl, 
& Allan, 1994; Allan & Gilbert, 1997; Gilbert & McGuire, 1998). Submissive displays have 
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been found to involve behaviours such as eye gaze avoidance, backing down when 
challenged, not advertising oneself, inhibition of confidence in oneself, and wanting to hide 
or escape when challenged (Gilbert, 1998; Lorenz, 1966). If shame does in fact evoke 
submissive behavioural strategies, there should be evidence that the individual who 
experiences shame will try to escape from the situation, or alternatively adopt submissive 
behaviours to limit possible social threats. This in turn restores social relations by evoking 
social approach in observers (Keltner & Harker, 1998).  
1.3.3 Internal vs. External Shame 
Despite shame often being considered a self-focused experience, regarding feeling 
inferior in some way, it primarily relates to how one thinks they exist in the minds of others 
(Keltner & Harker, 1998; Gilbert & McGuire, 1998). Similarly, it has been argued by Gilbert 
(1998) that shame can be either an internally-generated inner experience of one’s self; 
involving an involuntary affective-defensive response to the perceived threat of social 
rejection, or alternatively, an actual experience of social rejection by an individual or group. 
Therefore, shame may result from a private appraisal, through negative evaluations of one’s 
attributes or behaviours (Kaufman, 1989); ultimately judging one’s self as inferior, 
inadequate, or weak. Alternatively, shame may occur from a social event (e.g., being judged 
and shamed in the eyes of others), suggesting whether one is shamed by others or themselves, 
they can feel defeated, alienated and lacking in dignity or worth (Tomkins, 1963). Internal 
shame is associated with self-evaluations and self-directed effects of a negative nature (e.g., 
feelings of self-disgust; Gilbert, 2000). External shame however, occurs when feelings of 
shame are activated by the social environment, with evaluations focusing on aspects one 
believes others would reject if they were to become public. Cognitively, external shame 
regards how the person thinks others see them, whereas internal shame relates to feelings of 
self-devaluation (Gilbert, 1998). This distinction between internal and external shame is 
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important, and not always made by researchers in the area of shame. However, there is 
usually a connection between internal and external shame and when written people can often 
see this link (Gilbert et al., 2010).   
In a study by Goss, Gilbert and Allan (1994), it was found that in respect to general 
negative attributes (such as feelings of inadequacy, not being good enough, or being defective 
in the eyes of oneself), there was a high correlation between internal and external shame 
cognitions. This is not always the case however, for example, there exists evidence that 
socially stigmatised traits, being obese for example, does not inevitably lead to a sense of 
internal personal shame (Crocker & Major, 1989). That is, when one has feelings of 
inadequacy of one’s self, they expect others to see them in the same way. However, one does 
not always see themselves the same way that others do, leading to some discrepancies in the 
relationship between internal and external shame. It is not always one’s own behaviours or 
attributes that cause feelings of shame. It is possible to experience shame due to the 
behaviour of another, wherein a close connection is usually present (e.g., a friend or family 
member). An example of this could be a person who feels ashamed because a sibling has a 
severe and enduring mental health problem (Wasserman, de Mamani & Suro, 2012). In this 
case shame is experienced because that person (e.g., sibling) is a feature of the individual’s 
self-definition (Tangney & Tracy, 2011). Regardless of whether shame results from an 
internal or external cue, it has been suggested that clinicians would benefit from knowledge 
of behavioural indicators of shame to aid identification in on-going therapeutic interactions, 
so that it can be targeted and remediated (Keltner & Harker, 1998). 
1.3.4 Non-Verbal Markers of Shame 
There exists a belief that human emotions during face-to-face interactions are 
revealed through easily identifiable displays, displays that are non-verbal in nature (Izard, 
1977).  This is consistent with the consensus within the literature that shame, as with most 
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self-conscious emotions, is associated with cross-culturally recognisable non-verbal signals 
(Tracy & Robins, 2004b; Tracy & Robins, 2007; Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, 2009). While 
other emotions have been identified with similar non-verbal markers, studies have found 
shame to have its own distinct markers (Keltner, 1995), which differentiate it from other 
closely-related self-conscious emotions, like embarrassment and guilt. This follows on from 
Darwin’s (1872) initial idea that expressions of shame are characterised by blushing, 
confusion of mind, downward cast eyes, slack posture, and lowered head. Avoiding eye 
contact and holding the head down are also well-known behavioural markers of shame 
(Lewis, 1992). Non-verbal signals, such as head tilted downward and lowered eye gaze, have 
been demonstrated in studies to evoke above-chance recognition of shame (Martens, Tracy, 
& Shariff, 2012). While these non-verbal behavioural markers cause people to recognise 
shame, today’s concept of shame follows on from Darwin’s (1872) principle of antithesis; 
where he described certain expressions appearing the way they do because they emerged in 
opposition to other expressions (Martens et al., 2012). Darwin and others (1872; Heckhausen, 
1984; Stipek, Recchia, & Mc-Clintic, 1992) have considered shame expressions to be 
characterised by one’s head being bent down, eyes wavering, with the possible inclusion of 
slumped posture, suggesting shame to be antithetical to pride. Studies in recent years support 
these observations of shame (e.g. Izard, 1971; Keltner, 1995; Tracy & Robins, 2004b, 2007). 
While ‘basic’ emotions can be recognised through distinctive configurations of facial muscle 
movements, the recognition of ‘self-conscious’ emotions, like shame, require a particular and 
more complex combination of body movements. Studies of non-verbal behaviours have also 
found that shame is associated with non-verbal facial displays that are characteristic of 
submissiveness, such as eye gaze avoidance (Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Harker, 1998).  
Keltner (1995) hypothesized embarrassment and shame would have distinct displays 
if they signal apologies for different types of transgressions. This is derived from research 
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showing shame to follow failures to measure up to personal ideals (Babcock, 1988), while 
embarrassment follows violations of social comportment rules (Edelmann, 1987). In 
Keltner’s (1995) study, one hundred and eighty three students observed 24 different non-
verbal displays of six emotions (i.e., anger, disgust, enjoyment, amusement, embarrassment 
and shame). They were then required to indicate which of the six emotions best matched each 
emotional display, as well as the intensity of the display observed. The selected markers of 
shame included both head and gaze movements downwards. Whereas the markers for 
embarrassment consisted of gaze down (without head movement downwards), a controlled 
smile, head movements away, and face touching. Results attributed shame as the most intense 
emotion that was displayed. Consistent with the hypothesis, observers distinguished 
accurately between the displays of shame and embarrassment, with infrequent confusion of 
the two emotions, further demonstrating shame having its own distinct markers. 
1.3.5 Eye Gaze Diversion 
Gaze avoidance has been defined as “intentional avoidance of eye contact” (pp. 78, 
Kleinke, 1986). When eye contact is made during a face-to-face interaction, a person may 
wonder how they appear in the eyes of the other, or perhaps more generally query the 
meaning of the interaction (Kleinke, 1986). Looking into the eyes of another has been 
proposed to elicit a number of social cognitive and affective processes, including a 
heightened sense of self-awareness, which is key to self-conscious emotions. In situations 
where one deems another’s gaze to be negative or undesirable, their heightened self-
consciousness may increase gaze diversion, as a way to reduce negative feelings of exposure 
and ultimately reduce the experience of shame. Based upon current literature, it is 
recommended that future studies use a wider range of targets, where judges will find 
additional improvements in shame recognition when non-verbal displays such as eye gaze 
diversion are added (Tracy et al., 2009).  
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Based on the aforementioned non-verbal markers of shame, the current study aimed to 
investigate eye gaze diversion to determine if this non-verbal signal is related to shame in a 
general sense or is more prevalent when experiencing either internal or external shame. For 
example, if participants divert their gaze more while reading a scenario whilst looking at 
another person than looking at themselves, they are likely responding more to external shame 
than internal shame. Gilbert and McGuire (1998) assert eye gaze avoidance as one of the 
most primitive and prominent defensive signals, and is also the most common defensive 
behaviour of shame. In short, shame as a defensive behaviour appears to reflect a signal for 
submission, with Argyle (1967) asserting that if one lowers their eyes to another, this is a sign 
of submission to the other person’s wishes.  
1.4 Dissociation 
1.4.1 Conceptualising Dissociation 
Whilst gaze diversion may indeed reflect a behavioural means of reducing shame, 
psychological means may also be employed to moderate or limit the negative self-evaluations 
of shame; one such strategy may be dissociation (Dorahy, 2010; Kessler & Bieschke, 1999; 
Talbot, Talbot & Tu, 2004; Feiring, Taska & Lewis, 1996). The concept and facets of 
dissociation have been, and continue to be difficult to conceptualise. Dissociation has been 
broadly defined as a “disruption of the usually integrated functions of consciousness, 
memory, identity, or perception of the environment” (p. 447, American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). This definition is somewhat vague and has resulted in considerable 
confusion regarding the concept of dissociation (Cardena, 1994; Marshall, Spitzer & 
Liebowitz, 1999), but also exemplifies the challenges developing a unified understanding that 
is seen throughout the literature. 
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As it stands, there remains controversy surrounding the conceptual definition of 
dissociation, which is largely reflected in two competing views. The first view consists of 
dissociation denoting a vast range of experiences from detachment from one’s immediate 
surroundings through to the existence and alteration in identities (as seen in dissociative 
identity disorder). These experiences are thought to be nonpathological (“normal”) and 
pathological in nature respectively (e.g., Dalenberg & Paulson, 2009; Bernstein & Putnam, 
1986; Butler, 2004, 2006; Gold, 2004). Essentially, this concept encompasses the idea that 
common everyday occurrences, such as daydreaming, are nonpathological dissociation, while 
alterations in identities are a pathological form of dissociation. Theorists who take this stance 
conclude that evidence suggests “normal” dissociation is in fact still dissociation (Dalenberg 
& Paulson, 2009). The second view proposes that “normal” dissociation has been incorrectly 
added to the concept of dissociation, and rather represents alterations in consciousness, a 
different conceptual and phenomenological experience (e.g. Steele, Dorahy, Van der Hart, & 
Nijenhuis, 2009; Van der Hart, Nijenhuis, Steele & Brown, 2004). In this theory, structural 
dissociation at the level of personality is distinguished from changes in conscious awareness 
(e.g., alterations in consciousness); structural dissociation (pathological dissociation) involves 
a division of the personality and leads to dissociative symptoms, like ego-observing 
depersonalisation, amnesia and flashbacks. These symptoms are thought to be the by-
products of the existence and interplay between dissociative divisions of the personality (Van 
der Hart, Nijenhuis & Steele, 2006). Alterations in consciousness are not manifest from a 
latent dissociative structure, but rather reflect changes in the level (e.g., tired, alert) and field 
(narrow, broad) of consciousness. Phenomena emblematic of alterations in consciousness 
include absorption, perceptual distortions (e.g., derealisation) and lapses of awareness, while 
being associated with manifestations of dissociation they are distinct (Steele, Dorahy, Van 
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der Hart, Nijenhuis, 2009). The phenomena are easily confused however, as they tend to 
occur simultaneously.  
1.4.2 Motivations for Dissociation 
In instigating the systematic study of dissociation, the French philosopher/physician 
Pierre Janet (1901/1977), claimed dissociation occurred only in those who had a weakness of 
mental functioning, which in turn led to hysteria when one was excessively stressed. Janet 
also considered trauma to be merely one of a number of stressors that had the potential to 
worsen an already impaired mental efficiency of a hysteric person, generating a process (i.e., 
dissociation) leading to the occurrence of hysterical symptoms in that person. Ultimately, 
Janet insisted dissociation was purely a mental or cognitive deficit, rather than a defence 
mechanism (Janet, 1901/1977).  
However, more recently cases of dissociation have been regarded as a coping 
mechanism, or alternatively a defence mechanism to minimise the occurrence of the stress or 
conflict that is being experienced (Weiten & Lloyd, 2008; Snyder, 1999; Zeidner & Endler, 
1996). From this perspective a person may dissociate as a response to stress, including when 
they experience significant shame. As Simeon, Yehuda, Knutelska, and Schmeidler (2008) 
state, there has been a lack of attention given to dissociation over the years, which is 
“puzzling given limited but persuasive evidence that persistent dissociation after mass 
traumas has important consequences” (p. 325). Literature over the past decade has submitted 
that transitory dissociative experiences are reported in a large majority of individuals both in 
clinical and nonclinical populations, encompassing various cultures (Bernstein & Putnam, 
1986). 
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1.4.3 Symptoms of Pathological Dissociation 
As the present study intends to examine various forms of dissociation, these are 
described below. Literature suggests that depersonalisation/derealisation, amnesia and 
absorption are core features of dissociation (Ross, 1996; Kihlstrom, Glisky, & Angiulo, 1994; 
Ray, June, Turaj, & Lundy, 1992), but as noted above there is some debate about whether all 
of these reflect dissociation (e.g., absorption, derealisation; Steele et al., 2009). Dissociative 
experiences and symptoms occur with differing degrees of intensity and frequency in both 
clinical and general populations (Ross, Joshi, & Currie, 1990). Dissociative experiences can 
be distressing to individuals to the point where they feel out of control and alienated (Allen, 
Console, & Lewis, 1999), and have the potential to disrupt areas of psychological functioning 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). As often assumed to typify the dissociation 
construct (e.g., they are often identified in factors analyses of the DES), 
depersonalisation/derealisation, amnesia and absorption will now be examined further.  
1.4.3.1 Depersonalisation and Derealisation 
Depersonalisation refers to a subjective sense of detachment or disconnection from 
oneself. This may reflect detachment from one’s mental processes or body (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Depersonalisation experiences include, yet are not limited to; 
watching oneself from a distance (like viewing a movie), an out of body experience, feeling 
disconnected from one’s own thoughts, feeling numbed/detached from ones emotions, 
looking in the mirror and feeling detached from one’s image (Simeon, 2009; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000; Coons, 1996; Lambert, Senior, Fewtrel; Steinberg, 2001). 
Often, depersonalisation is associated with derealisation, in which an individual perceives the 
external world as strange, or unreal; almost dreamlike in nature (Sierra & Berrios, 2000). 
Whereas experiences of derealisation are often characterised by visual distortions, such as 
blurriness, widened or narrowed visual field, flatness, or altered distance or size of objects. 
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Auditory distortions can also occur, where noises are muted or heightened (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). While both experiences are known to co-occur, they remain 
distinct phenomena (Baker et al., 2003). 
1.4.3.2 Amnesia 
The defining characteristic for dissociative amnesia, formerly referred to as 
psychogenic amnesia, is the inability to recall important autobiographical information, where 
this inability to recollect cannot be attributed to normal circumstances such as forgetfulness 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Dissociative amnesia results from a psychological 
defence in relation to a potential cause, for example a stressful or traumatic event; rather than 
direct damage to the brain, such as head injury, physical trauma, or disease, which is referred 
to as organic amnesia (Kopelman, Christensen, Puffett & Stanhope, 1994). Dissociative 
amnesia has been found to include three different types of amnesia: localised, selective, or 
generalised (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Localised is where an individual 
cannot recollect events that took place within a limited period of time, for example, some 
survivors of the 2011 Christchurch earthquakes may not remember how they got out of 
damaged buildings. Selective is where an individual can recall some, yet not all of the events 
that occurred in a limited time period, for example, a rape victim may recall parts of the 
event, rather than the event in its entirety. Lastly, generalised amnesia is where an individual 
cannot remember chunks or aspects of their own life, such as between the ages of 5 and 8 
years.  
1.4.3.3 Absorption 
Absorption may be described as a period where ones whole attention is fully engaged 
in his or her mental imagery (Roche & McConkey, 1990). Absorption experiences can 
include fantasising, daydreaming, or becoming so engaged in a task, that one becomes 
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unaware of other external events, and is unaware of the passage of time passed. Absorbed 
attention is centered and amplifies to a great extent the experience of one aspect of reality, 
whilst other aspects recede from an individual’s awareness (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). 
Therefore, the absorbed individual appears not to notice external events that would usually 
draw their attention. The vivid subjective reality one experiences during absorbed attention 
may, during a more normal state of awareness, appear as altered, or imaginary. Experiences 
of absorption have been described as common, being mild and nonpathological in nature 
within the general population (Roche & McConkey, 1990). Yet, absorption can be 
experienced at pathological levels (Somer, 2002). As noted above, some theories of 
dissociation exclude the construct of absorption. The current research took an atheoretical 
approach to this issue and examined whether absorption was associated to shame 
experiences. 
1.5 Shame, Trauma, and Dissociation 
Shame is believed to reflect an indictment of one’s core self. Of which, this condemnation of 
the self has consequences for psychological functioning (e.g., cognition, emotion and 
behaviour) that are insidious and persistent (Lewis, 1992; Gilbert, 2002; Gilbert & Irons, 
2005; Gilbert & Procter, 2006). It has been suggested that the nature of shame experiences 
have powerful characteristics similar to traumatic memories, evoking intrusions, avoidance, 
fragmented states of mind and dissociation. However, this has not been empirically 
investigated (Matos & Pinto-Gouveia, 2010). Authors have proposed shame experiences may 
be recorded in autobiographical memory as conditioned emotional responses, impacting the 
formations of self-relevant beliefs, in emotional and attentional processing (Gilbert, 2002; 
Kaufman, 1989; Lewis, 1992). Clinical and empirical data supports this notion, suggesting 
that early shame experiences might indeed operate like traumatic memories in 
autobiographical memory, potentially increasing the vulnerability to psychopathology 
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(Claesson & Sohlberg, 2002; Gilbert, 2002). Shame has frequently been associated with a 
number of psychological disorders including posttraumatic stress disorder, borderline 
personality disorder, and eating disorders; it is important to note that these disorders often 
include an aspect of dissociation (Matos & Pinto-Gouveia, 2010). Matos & Pinto-Gouveia 
(2010) investigated the nature of shame as a traumatic memory, with specific regards to 
traumatic characteristics of early shame experiences. It was established that early shame 
experiences do reveal traumatic memory characteristics, and that those shame experiences 
associated with participants’ current feelings of both internal and external shame in 
adulthood. Furthermore, Platt and Freyd (2015) examined the association between betrayal 
trauma, shame, dissociation, and fear responses to perceived threat. It was found participants 
that endorsed high-betrayal trauma, not low-betrayal trauma, were more prone to experiences 
of shame and dissociation when viewing images of interpersonal threat, suggesting the 
intensity of trauma experiences may influence later experiences of shame and dissociation. 
Shame in traumatised individuals is often ignored by researchers and clinicians 
(Dorahy, 2010). Although, it has been proposed that when one is shamed repeatedly they will 
act to eliminate this negative state in ways that may lead to depression (e.g., attacks on self), 
acting out, avoidance, and dissociation (Andrews, Valentine, Valentine 1995; Harder & 
Lewis 1986; Lewis 1992). Dissociation may be employed to moderate and possibly even 
eradicate one’s experience of shame (Feiring, Taska, & Lewis, 1996; Lewis, 1992). For 
example, dissociative symptoms have been linked to sexual abuse, where it has been 
suggested the association may be mediated by shame (Lewis, 1992; Ross 1989). 
Consequently, abuse may lead to shame, which due to its intensity may produce dissociation 
and likely impact psychological functioning.      
It is evident literature on the association between shame and dissociation has received 
very little attention. A recent study investigated whether patients with borderline personality 
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disorder (BPD) had a stronger shame reaction after an emotion induction exercise, 
specifically designed to induce shame (Scheel et al., n.d.). While the study did not look 
specifically at the association between shame and dissociation it found that BPD patients 
reported higher shame and sadness ratings overall in comparison to a major depressive 
disorder (MDD) group, as well as higher negative ratings of all emotions in comparison to the 
healthy control group. Such findings raise the question of the psychological mechanisms 
associated with shame in psychiatric disorders. 
1.6 The Present Study 
The present study sought to better understand shame, specifically with regard to its 
non-verbal marker of eye gaze diversion, and its association with dissociation. It aimed to 
identify the immediate behavioural (gaze diversion) and psychological (dissociation) effects 
following a potentially shameful event. Specifically the study sought to investigate eye-gaze 
diversion during shame-induced, script-driven narratives. While participants were reading the 
narratives during shame induction they were either looking at themselves, the experimenter, 
or a neutral image. These different conditions allow both internal (looking at self) and 
external (looking at experimenter) shame to be examined within the study. This study also 
seeks to examine whether or not symptoms of dissociation occur during an induction of 
shame, through self-report measures. Furthermore, this study will examine participants’ 
physiological arousal during an induction of shame through the monitoring of heart rate. 
Finally, shame will be examined as a traumatic experience by ascertaining whether shame 
inductions resulted in later intrusive memories in participants. The current study will involve 
collecting measures of shame, dissociation, state emotional experience and physiological 
arousal, during the shame induction, in addition to the completion of an intrusion diary after 
the induction.   
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1.6.1 Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis One: Individuals will divert their gaze more in the shame condition when 
looking at themselves or the experimenter compared to the neutral screen. There will be no 
difference in eye gaze diversion between internal and external shame. This was expected as 
literature shows shame associated with gaze diversion when one feels exposed to the self or 
others. 
      Hypothesis Two: Dissociation during shame induction will be higher in participants 
who looked at themselves in a mirror (internalised shame) or at the experimenter 
(externalised shame) compared to the neutral condition where participants look at a neutral 
screen, indicating greater use of dissociation as a means of regulating shame.  
 Hypothesis Three: Participants looking at themselves or the experimenter will have 
more memories of the shame scenario over a period of two days following the study, than 
those participants in the neutral condition. That is, the inductions involving internal and 
external shame were expected to be more distressing (leading to more intrusions) than the 
neutral induction. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
2.1 Participants 
 Participants were 33 individuals who were seeking counselling for psychological or 
relationship difficulties at the time of the research, and were recruited through a number of 
counselling services and support groups (see Appendix A). 
Of the 33 participants, 54.5% (n = 18) were female and 45.5% (n = 15) were male. 
The age of participants ranged from 19 years to 63 years, with a mean of 36.1 years. In 
regards to ethnicity, 78.8% (n = 26) identified as New Zealand European and 3% (n = 1) as 
Māori. The remaining 18.2% (n = 6) indicated their ethnicity as Chinese, Korean, German, 
British, Dutch and ‘Other’. In terms of reason for seeking counselling 24.2% (n = 8) 
identified their main reason as anxiety, 21.2% (n = 7) depression, 30.3% (n = 10) 
trauma/PTSD, 6.1% (n = 2) grief, 6.1% (n = 2) relationship difficulties, 6.1% (n = 2) personal 
growth, 3% (n = 1) anorexia and 3% (n = 1) personality problems. 
2.2 Measures 
In addition to four brief questions pertaining to demographic information (sex, age, 
ethnicity and reason for seeking counselling), this study utilised questionnaires to assess trait 
and state dissociation, and trait and state shame. In addition, physiological and behavioural 
assessments were made of heart rate, heart rate variability, non-verbal behaviours (e.g., gaze 
diversion) and post-study intrusions of the experimental stimuli. All questionnaires were 
presented and completed online using Qualtrics Survey Software. Questionnaire responses 
and layout were kept identical to original paper versions. 
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2.2.1 Dissociative Experience Scale (DES) 
The DES (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) measures experiences of dissociation during 
daily life (see Appendix F). The DES is a self-assessment questionnaire comprising 28 items, 
assessing areas of amnesia, depersonalisation/derealisation, and absorption. An example item 
which reflects amnesia is “some people have the experience of finding themselves in a place 
and having no idea how they got there”. Each item is rated as a percentage, between 0 and 
100 in 10 point increments, of how often the experience occurs, with higher scores indicating 
more frequent dissociation. The DES is a psychometrically sound measure of dissociation 
with excellent internal consistency in clinical samples (α = 0.97; test-retest, r = 0.93; 
Dubester & Braun, 1995). Similarly, item-scale score (i.e. amnesia, 
depersonalisation/derealisation, absorption) correlations were all significant, indicating good 
internal consistency and construct validity (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986). The DES was used in 
the current study as a measure of trait dissociation and demonstrated good internal 
consistency for DES-total (α = 0.95) and DES-taxon (α = 0.81). 
2.2.2 Experience of Shame Scale (ESS) 
 The ESS is designed to measure experiences of shame at any time during the past year 
(Andrews, Qian, & Valentine, 2002) (see Appendix G). The ESS assesses the areas of 
characterological shame (e.g., shame of personal habits), behavioural shame (e.g., shame 
about doing something wrong), and bodily shame (e.g., feeling ashamed of one’s own body) 
through 25 items. An example item which reflects bodily shame is “have you wanted to hide 
or conceal your body or any part of it?” Each item is rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 
(“not at all”) to 4 (“very much”), with higher ratings reflecting a higher level of shame. The 
total score of the ESS has yielded a high internal consistency (α = 0.92), and test-retest 
reliability is also high when examined over an 11 week period (α = 0.83; Andrews et al., 
2002). Further, evidence has been provided for construct validity, as the ESS total and the 
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component subscales all significantly correlated with the Test of Self-Conscious Affect’s 
shame scale (TOSCA; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). The ESS was used in 
the current study as a measure of trait shame and demonstrated good internal consistency for 
characterological shame (α = 0.88), behavioural shame (α = 0.83), bodily shame (α = 0.83) 
and total shame (α = 0.93). 
2.2.3 Peritraumatic Dissociative Experiences Questionnaire (PDEQ) 
To measure current feelings of dissociation the modified PDEQ was employed (see 
Appendix H). The modified PDEQ (Marshal et al., 2002) consists of eight self-report items, 
rated on a 5-point scale from 0 (“not at all true”) to 4 (“very much true”). Four items on the 
PDEQ aim to assess alterations in consciousness, while the remaining four are thought to 
assess structural dissociation, allowing for potential differentiation between the two forms of 
dissociation. The modified PDEQ has been found to be a satisfactorily valid and reliable 
instrument for the measurement of current state dissociative symptoms, with an adequate 
level of internal consistency (α = 0.83; Marshal et al., 2002). It has also exhibited good test-
retest reliability (α = 0.85; Marshal et al., 2002), as well as convergent validity, which was 
established through a strong correlation between the original PDEQ and modified PDEQ (r = 
0.89; Marshall et al., 2002). The modified PDEQ was used here to assess the degree of 
dissociation experienced during the experimental procedure in a succinct manner. Internal 
consistency for the current study was good for shame (α = 0.89) and neutral induction (α = 
0.79). 
2.2.4 State Shame and Guilt Scale (SSGS) 
The SSGS (Marschall, Saftner, & Tangney, 1994) assesses current feelings of shame, 
pride, and guilt (see Appendix I). The SSGS is a 15 item scale with 5 items measuring each 
of the 3 self-conscious emotions. Responses are made on a 5-point scale, where 1 is “not 
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feeling this way at all” and 5 is “feeling this way very strongly”. Higher scores indicate more 
state shame, guilt, and pride. “I feel worthless, powerless” and “I feel small” are example 
statements of shame items. Internal consistency for the SSGS has been found to be good (α = 
0.87; Stoeber, Harris, & Moon, 2007; α = 0.88 (Stoeber, Kempe & Keogh, 2008). The SSGS 
has also established good inter-item reliability for guilt (α = 0.82), pride (α = 0.87) and shame 
(α = 0.89) (Marschall et al., 1994). The SSGS was used here as a validity measure to assess 
whether the experimental task induced shame over other self-conscious emotions (e.g., guilt), 
therefore only the shame subscale was interpreted. Internal consistency in the current study 
was good for shame (α = 0.90) and neutral induction (α = 0.91). 
2.2.5 Additional Scales 
 In order to assess the exact emotion/s participants experienced following each 
induction, sliding scales were used for a list of emotions (anger, shame, sadness, disgust, 
surprise, anxiety, embarrassment, guilt, and pride). Participants identified which emotion/s 
they experienced as well as the degree to which the emotion/s were felt during and/or 
immediately after each induction task. Responses ranged between 0 and 100, where 0 
indicated “not at all” and 100 indicated “completely”. Furthermore, participants were also 
asked to rate how absorbed they felt in each induction task (i.e. narrative) on the same scale.  
The emotion and absorption questions were asked to assess how effective the shame 
induction narratives were in producing the shame emotion and how absorbed participants felt 
during each induction task. 
2.2.6 Condition 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions; experimenter, self, and 
neutral. The experimenter condition required participants to look through a window at the 
experimenter (external shame) while verbalising the shame and neutral narratives. 
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Participants in the self condition were asked to look into their own eyes (internal shame) by 
looking at a mirror whilst verbalising narratives. Lastly, participants in the neutral condition 
were required to look at white strips on a black screen whilst verbalising narratives.  
2.2.7 Shame Induction 
In order to experimentally induce shame, participants were instructed to listen through 
headphones to a recorded narrative and repeat verbally, a 1) shame and 2) associated neutral 
scenario. The motif for each scenario was chosen from a possible three vignettes that were 
used in an earlier study (McKendry, 2013). This study had shame-related scenarios involved 
being caught masturbating by a family member, having soiled underwear in a swimming pool 
changing room, and having mucus on ones face at a bank. The current study adopted the 
‘bank’ scenario as it was deemed the most appropriate given the participants selected for the 
study, as some participants had abuse histories and it was felt the masturbation scenario may 
have activated too much distress.  
Participants were in counselling at the time of the study and it was believed a clinical 
population would be more susceptible to the shame induction. The ‘bank’ scenario was 
thought to cause least offence but also had the capacity to elicit shame responses (McKendry, 
2013). The scenario outlined a situation where the participants were publically ridiculed by a 
bank teller for having mucus on their face while making a transaction. The neutral (control) 
scenario used exactly the same setting and situation (transaction in a bank), but replaced 
shame-evoking stimuli with neutral stimuli (See Appendix J for shame and neutral 
inductions). Participants heard each narrative one line at a time using pronouns given in the 
second person (e.g., ‘you went into the bank’) and had to repeat each line using first person 
pronouns (e.g., ‘I went into the bank’). To ensure experimental control, the order in which 
participants verbalised the shame and neutral scenarios were counterbalanced. The pairing of 
scenario (shame, neutral) and experimental condition (between subject variable; 
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experimenter, self, neutral) was also randomised to ensure experimental control within the 
study. An image of the final set up can be found in Appendix M.    
While completing the scenarios task in one of the 3 conditions, participants’ non-
verbal behaviours (e.g., gaze diversion) were measured via video recorder. These non-verbal 
behaviours were coded using Ekman and Friesen’s Facial Action Coding System (FACS: 
Ekman & Friesen, 1976, 1978), a system which categorises the physical expression of 
emotions. FACS (Appendix N) lists 44 visually distinguishable facial expressions while 
separating these into categories of head and eye movements. The scenarios utilised in the 
current research were designed in such a way that non-verbal behaviours could be recorded 
with regard to what word/words and line of narrative the participant was verbalising at the 
time. For example, if a participant were to smile, that non-verbal behaviour would be coded 
as a smile at the point in the narrative it occurred, including whether the narrative was being 
heard or spoken. Behaviours were coded separately or in combination with each other if 
behaviours occurred simultaneously. 
2.2.8 Physiological Measures 
 BioPac was used during the inductions in order to examine the differences equated in 
heart rate (number of heart beats per minute), LogHRV (variation in the time interval 
between heartbeats) and LogRSA (basic measure of vagal/parasympathetic tone measuring 
the maximum and minimum changes in heart rate during respiration) in shame and neutral 
scenarios. To prepare for the physiological recording, the experimenter attached two 
electrodes to the skin just below each elbow on the inside of the arm, and one on the right 
wrist. The electrode on the wrist served as a ground. The electrode leads were plugged into an 
AC amplifier and the ECG signal, sampled at .5-35 Hz, with a 50/60Hz notch and amplified 
1000 times, which was recorded using BioPac Student Lab Software.   
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2.2.9 Intrusion Diary 
Following the completion of the shame induction and questionnaires, participants 
were given a diary to record whether they had any intrusions (e.g., thoughts, memories, 
feelings) related to the content of the shame and neutral induction over the 2 day period 
following the study (See Appendix K). This ‘intrusion’ period began as soon as participants 
left the assessment session and ended with a follow-up assessment 2 days later. During this 
time participants recorded the time and description of each intrusion. In addition, participants 
recorded their perceived level of emotional distress during each intrusion on a Subjective 
Unit of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1969), ranging from 0 (“totally relaxed, no emotion”) 
to 10 (“highest emotion you have ever felt”). Participants were also asked to write down any 
feelings they experienced during the intrusion and a description of the intrusion’s contents. 
2.3 Laboratory 
Arrangement of the room in which the experiment took place was set up in such a 
way that video recording and sound quality were optimised. In order to achieve this, the 
windows were covered with black plastic sheets and any reflective surfaces were concealed, 
to minimise light which otherwise may have shown the function of the one-way mirror.   
The one-way mirror was constructed to be used simply, without participants being 
aware of its true function (i.e. when the participant is looking at the experimenter the 
experimenter is not able to see the participant as they may believe). Furthermore, this mirror 
was created on a portable stand that could be moved and turned effortlessly, allowing for a 
simple adjustment between conditions. The one-way mirror was purposefully placed so that 
when each participant entered the lab they were unaware of its true function. 
In the neutral condition a lamp was placed nearby, to the side of the portable mirror, 
to allow participants to view the white strips on the black screen that sat in front of the 
mirror, as well as adding light to the room in order for the camera to capture the participants’ 
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facial behaviours. This ensured a clear view of the participant on the video recording, 
improving the ability to recognise facial behaviours.  
Lastly, the portable mirror was able to be adjusted to complement the height of each 
participant, to allow for effective recording of participants facial features during the 
experiment, which was done with a video recorder attached on top of the portable mirror. 
2.4 Procedure 
Prior to commencement, ethical approval for this study was granted by the University 
of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee (approval letter can be seen in Appendix E). The 
study was advertised in counselling agencies (see Appendix D). 
Upon showing interest in participating in the study participants were emailed or called 
and provided with location details and a time suitable to the participant was arranged. 
Participants were also given an opportunity to ask any questions they currently had. Those 
who initially consented to partake in the study were given an information sheet outlining the 
study (Appendix B). Additionally, verbal instructions outlining the study’s expected duration, 
confidentiality procedures and remuneration were provided for further understanding. 
Moreover, clarification was given regarding participants’ right to withdraw from the study 
after reading the information sheet. Any questions were answered by the experimenter and 
consent forms were signed (Appendix C).  
Participants were verbally instructed “First I will get you to complete a questionnaire 
asking about some emotions and experiences you may have and how you respond to them. 
You will not be asked to give any personal details about your experiences, just the degree to 
which you feel them.  We are interested in getting as accurate a snapshot of your experience 
as possible. So please be as honest as you can, regardless of your answer.” 
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The researcher then administered the first set of questionnaires which consisted of 
demographic questions (i.e. age, sex and ethnicity), trait shame (Experience of Shame Scale), 
trait dissociation (Dissociative Experience Scale).  
After completing the questionnaire participants were then asked to place themselves 
in front of the mirror, after which three BioPac leads were attached; one on each of the 
participants’ inner elbows, and a third placed on an inner wrist, to record participants 
physiological measures (e.g. heart rate) during the induction procedure. While the leads were 
being attached the researcher ensured participants that they were safe. Participants were then 
provided with further instruction regarding the first block of the experiment.  
Participants were informed “you are going to hear a story broken into sentences.  
After each sentence, I would like you to repeat the sentence. However, the sentences you hear 
are in the second person, for example you will hear “you rode the bike”.  Your task is to 
repeat the sentence, but in the first person, for example, “I rode the bike”. I would ask that 
you concentrate your efforts on looking at your eyes/ my eyes/ the white strips (depending on 
participant condition). And please keep your arms on the arms of the chair and as still as 
possible. Also, we would ask that you get as absorbed as you can in the story. Try imagining 
yourself fully in the story”. The researcher began recording on the video recorder at this 
point. 
  Additionally, participants completed a practice block which comprised three neutral 
sentences.  The practice was designed in order for participants to understand how to verbally 
convert the sentences heard from a second person narrative to a first person narrative, and if 
necessary the researcher provided further explanation. The researcher used this practice block 
as the baseline for physiological measures and subsequently each induction block as separate 
segments. 
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Upon completion of the first induction block (i.e. shame and neutral) participants 
went on to complete state dissociation (modified PDEQ), state shame (SSGS), as well as 
scales measuring the degree to which participants felt certain emotions during/immediately 
after the induction, and additionally two questions regarding the degree to which they felt 
absorbed in the story.  As before, participants were given the same instructions preceding 
completion of the questionnaires.  
With the exception of the opposite narrative to Block 1 being presented, Block 2 
followed the same structure and procedure as Block 1. As before, instructions were given to 
participants. Again, state shame and dissociation scales were completed following this, as 
well as the scale pertaining to the degree certain emotions were felt during the induction and 
how much participants felt a part of the story. 
Lastly, participants were given the intrusion diary. Participants completed this diary 
over the two days following the experimental assessment, after which participants returned 
the diaries to the experimenter. Overall, although time varied with each participant, the study 
took approximately 30 minutes, with the exception of the intrusion diary which was 
completed over a period of two days.  
Participants were debriefed (see Appendix L) and thanked at the end of the study. 
Participants were also given $30 in petrol and grocery vouchers for participating in the study. 
Additionally, participants were given a list of helpful contacts if they required additional 
support.  
2.5 Data Analysis 
 All data gathered was coded and entered into the statistical programme Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences 17 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois). Following descriptive 
statistical analyses, Wilk’s Lambda was used as the significance test in overall analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) calculations.  Statistical significance was set at the p <0.05 level. 
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  In order to determine if any significant differences existed across age and sex measures 
(e.g., shame and dissociation) for the three conditions (i.e., when participants looked at 
themselves in a mirror, looked at the researcher or the neutral screen), a one-way between 
subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for age, and a chi square analysis was 
conducted for sex. To assess the ability of the experimental induction to induce shame, self-
report ratings of nine different emotions (i.e., anger, shame, sadness, disgust, surprise, 
anxiety, embarrassment, guilt and pride) rated after the neutral and shame inductions were 
examined using a 2 (induction: neutral, shame) by 3 (condition: experimenter, self and 
neutral) mixed multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). To further examine the ability 
of the shame induction to elicit shame, a two-way mixed ANOVA (induction x condition) 
was conducted to examine if state shame ratings differed from baseline (prior to hearing the 
audio narratives) to post narratives (neutral and shame), across the three conditions.  Finally, 
a two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to assess the difference in degree to which 
participants felt a part of and absorbed in both the neutral and shame narratives across all 
three conditions. 
2.5.1 Process for Examining Gaze Diversion 
 To assess gaze diversion, video recordings were viewed following experimental 
induction and instances of gaze diversion were coded (e.g. gaze diversion to the left) using 
the FACS, by two coders to maximise coding consistency of participants’ non-verbal 
behaviours. To directly test hypothesis one audio narratives (shame and neutral) heard by 
participants were broken into three sentence types (neutral, shame/shame equivalent and 
residual shame/residual shame equivalent; see Appendix J). Three sentences of each narrative 
were deemed neutral, six sentences as shame/shame equivalent and three sentences as 
residual shame/residual shame equivalent. Neutral sentences were sentences at the beginning 
of narratives which were deemed not shame evoking in nature. Shame sentences were coded 
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as sentences in the shame narrative due to their potential shameful nature, whereas shame 
equivalent sentences were the sentence alternatives in the neutral narrative. Residual 
shame/residual shame equivalent sentences were sentences following the previous shame and 
shame equivalent sentences in the shame and neutral narratives respectively. Sentence types 
were examined across the three conditions (self, experimenter and neutral screen) in a 2 
(audio narratives: shame, neutral) x 3 (sentence type: neutral, shame/shame equivalent, 
residual shame/residual shame equivalent) x 3 (condition: self, experimenter, neutral screen) 
mixed ANOVA.  Additional tests were utilised to further examine induction effects on eye 
gaze diversion. The dependent variable was the frequency participants diverted eye gaze. 
2.5.2 Process for Examining State Dissociation following Shame Induction 
 To test hypothesis two, a two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to examine if state 
dissociation differed across conditions (self, experimenter and neutral screen) for both the 
neutral and shame inductions.  Additionally, post hoc tests were utilised to further examine 
simple effects. 
2.5.3 Process for Examining Intrusions following Shame Induction 
 To test hypothesis three, a mixed ANOVA was conducted to examine if intrusion 
frequency differed across experimenter, self and neutral conditions for both day one and two 
as reported within the intrusion diaries. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
3.1 Experimental Condition Characteristics and Manipulation Checks 
 No significant differences were found for age across the three experimental conditions 
(experimenter, self, neutral), F (2, 30) = 1.57, p = .23 (see Table 1).  
 
 Similarly, no significant differences were found for sex across experimental condition, 
2(2, N = 33) = 2.93, p = .23 (See Table 2).  
 
 Tables 3 and 4 display ethnicity and reason for counselling across experimental 
conditions. Further analyses were not conducted as some cells had zero participants. 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Age across Conditions  
Age  Mean; M (Standard Deviation; SD) 
Experimenter 
Self 
Neutral 
30.82 (15.34) 
41.27 (11.21) 
36.18 (14.65) 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Sex across Conditions  
Sex Experimenter Self Neutral 
Male 
Female 
5 
6 
7 
4 
3 
8 
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 Exploratory data analysis for questionnaire measures revealed significant skewness for 
DES-taxon, state shame across baseline, neutral and shame conditions and PDEQ for neutral 
and shame conditions. Log transformations were used on these variables to normalise the 
data. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 5. MANOVA analyses examining 
differences across groups for trait measures produced no multivariate significant differences, 
F (10, 54) = .88, p = .56, 
𝑝
2  = .14. As a result there was no univariate effect for ESS 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Ethnicity across Conditions 
Ethnicity Experimenter Self Neutral 
New Zealand European 9 9 8 
Maori 0 0 1 
Chinese 0 0 1 
Korean 1 0 0 
Dutch 0 1 0 
British 1 0 0 
German 0 1 0 
Other 0 0 1 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Reasons for Seeking Counselling across Conditions 
Reason for Seeking Counselling Experimenter Self Neutral 
Anxiety 2 3 3 
Depression 4 0 3 
Grief 0 2 0 
Personal Growth 0 1 1 
Personality Problems 0 0 1 
Trauma/PTSD 4 4 2 
Relationship Difficulties 0 1 1 
Anorexia 1 0 0 
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characterological shame, F (2, 30) = .43, p = .65, 
𝑝
2   = .03; ESS behavioural shame, F (2, 30) 
= 1.81, p = .18, 
𝑝
2   = .11; ESS bodily shame, F (2, 30) = 1.41, p = .26, 
𝑝
2   = .09; ESS total 
shame, F (2, 30) = .87, p = .43, 
𝑝
2   = .06; DES-total, F (2, 30) = .75, p = .48, 
𝑝
2   = .05; or 
DES-taxon, F (2, 30) = 1.45, p = .25, 
𝑝
2   = .09. 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Questionnaire Measures across Conditions 
Questionnaire Measures 
Condition 
n = 33 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
ESS Characterological Shame 
Experimenter 
Self 
Neutral 
27.45 
28.18 
30.27 
4.95 
8.96 
7.71 
ESS Behavioural Shame 
Experimenter 
Self 
Neutral 
26.45 
22.45 
26.09 
4.46 
5.68 
6.11 
ESS Bodily Shame 
Experimenter 
Self 
Neutral 
11.27 
9.9 
11.09 
3.41 
2.95 
3.73 
ESS Total Shame 
Experimenter 
Self 
Neutral 
65.18 
59.73 
67.45 
9.44 
15.80 
16.07 
DES Total 
Experimenter 
Self 
Neutral 
21.28 
16.37 
24.95 
13.75 
17.41 
17.93 
DES Taxon 
Experimenter 
Self 
Neutral 
.85 
.45 
.97 
.66 
.83 
.74 
 
3.1.1 Emotion Ratings 
 To examine changes in self-reported individual emotions (e.g., anger, shame, 
embarrassment, guilt) a 2 (induction: neutral, shame) by 3 (condition: experimenter, self and 
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neutral) mixed MANOVA was conducted on all nine emotions assessed. Descriptive statistics 
can be found in Table 6. There were no multivariate main effects for condition (experimenter, 
self and neutral), indicating emotional ratings did not differ across the three conditions for 
overall emotion ratings. Given the diversity of emotions the univariate analyses were 
examined and showed a significant effect for guilt across conditions, F (2, 30) = 3.23, p = 
.05, 
𝑝
2 = .18. Post hoc tests show higher guilt ratings in the neutral versus experimenter (p = 
.04) and self (p = .03) condition. The multivariate main effect for emotion reached 
significance, indicating more emotional arousal following the shame induction, F (9, 22) = 
2.80, p = .02, 
𝑝
2 = .53. Significant increases were found in shame induction compared to 
neutral induction for anger, F (1, 30) = 10.28, p = .003, 
𝑝
2 = .26; shame, F (1, 30) = 19.69, p 
= .00, 
𝑝
2 = .40; sadness, F (1, 30) = 12.47, p = .001, 
𝑝
2 = .29; disgust, F (1, 30) = 6.07, p = 
.02, 
𝑝
2 = .17; anxiety, F (1, 30) = 17.26, p = .00, 
𝑝
2 = .37; embarrassment, F (1, 30) = 
17.12, p = .00, 
𝑝
2 = .36; and guilt, F (1, 30) = 4.54, p = .04, 
𝑝
2 = .13. No significant 
differences were found across inductions for surprise, F (1, 30) = .94, p = .34, 
𝑝
2 = .03. 
Additionally, there was no multivariate interaction between emotion and condition, F (18, 46) 
= .78, p = .71, 
𝑝
2 = .23, and no interactions were found at a univariate level. This indicates 
that the shame induction was effective in eliciting higher emotion (i.e., anger, shame, 
sadness, disgust, anxiety, and embarrassment) than the neutral induction. 
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for Emotion across Conditions 
Emotion 
 
Induction 
Experimenter 
M (SD) 
Self 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
M (SD) 
Anger Neutral 6.09 (20.20) .09 (.30) .36 (1.21) 
Shame 29.27 (37.49) 17.91 (34.36) 9.91 (16.56) 
Shame Neutral 10.27 (18.85) 1.36 (3.41) 3.64 (7.72) 
Shame 27.18 (30.38) 18.36 (25.44) 33.55 (34.15) 
Sadness Neutral 4.82 (13.14) 2.09 (6.93) 2.45 (6.33) 
Shame 18.45 (28.76) 19.55 (30.53) 25.91 (36.76) 
Disgust Neutral 4.55 (15.08) .00 (.00) 6.45 (14.10) 
Shame 10.64 (18.86) 17.91 (27.02) 19.27 (30.70) 
Surprise Neutral 9.82 (14.41) 14.18 (26.70) 14.36 (23.69) 
Shame 14.55 (19.75) 22.64 (31.54) 17.55 (18.66) 
Anxiety Neutral 22.82 (28.20) 7.45 (14.40) 19.91 (17.98) 
Shame 31.82 (31.67) 29.45 (27.02) 39.27 (31.05) 
Embarrassment Neutral 7.27 (13.81) 5.09 (11.17) 21.09 (29.12) 
Shame 28.00 (30.11) 31.73 (35.01) 46.18 (37.31) 
Guilt Neutral .36 (.92) .73 (2.41) 14.36 (29.64) 
Shame 6.00 (19.90) 3.45 (7.70) 26.00 (35.34) 
Pride Neutral 6.09 (12.87) 18.00 (26.51) 11.00 (18.22) 
Shame .45 (1.21) 3.82 (6.48) 11.00 (23.19) 
 
3.1.2 Physiological Measures 
 Three one-way ANOVA’s were conducted to test three different physiological 
measures across conditions. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 7. No effects were 
found for mean heart rate, F (2, 30) = .15, p = .86; LogHRV, F (2, 30) = .21, p = .82; or 
LogRSA, F (2, 30) = .04, p = .96. This indicates there were no differences between 
participants’ physiological measures between conditions.  
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Physiological Measures across Conditions  
Physiological Measure Condition M (SD) 
Mean Heart Rate Experimenter 80.70 (13.85) 
78.80 (14.05) 
77.55 (12.88) 
7.04 (.97) 
7.30 (1.05) 
7.10 (.95) 
5.19 (1.68) 
5.35 (1.75) 
5.38 (1.35) 
 Self 
 Neutral 
LogHRV Experimenter 
 Self 
 Neutral 
LogRSA Experimenter 
 Self 
 Neutral 
 
3.1.3 State Shame Measures 
 Mixed ANOVA analyses examining state shame scores for condition (experimenter, 
self, neutral) by emotion (baseline, neutral narrative, shame narrative) produced a significant 
main effect for emotion, F (2, 60) = 8.03, p = .001, 
𝑝
2  = .21. A one way repeated measures 
ANOVA on the emotion main effect utilising simple contrasts found higher state shame 
scores following the shame induction compared to the neutral induction, F (1, 32) = 14.35, p 
= .001, 
𝑝
2  = .31. Higher state shame scores were also evident following the shame induction 
when compared to baseline, however this effect fell marginally short of significance, F (1, 
32) = 3.09, p = .09, 
𝑝
2  =.09). There was no main effect for condition, F (2, 30) = .92, p = .41, 

𝑝
2  = .06 and no significant emotion by condition interaction, F (4, 60) = .93, p = .45, 
𝑝
2  = 
.06. This indicates participants experienced higher levels of shame following shame 
inductions compared to neutral inductions and baseline. Descriptive statistics can be found in 
Table 8.  
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3.1.4 Degree to Which Participants Felt a Part of and Absorbed in Narratives 
 A 2 (emotion: neutral, shame) by 3 (condition: experimenter, self and neutral) mixed 
ANOVA for the degree to which participants felt a part of the story produced no main effects 
for emotion, F (1, 30) = .08, p = .78, 
𝑝
2 = .003; or condition, F (2, 30) = 1.03, p = .37, 
𝑝
2  = 
.06. Furthermore, there was no significant interaction effect for emotion by condition, F (2, 
30) = .71, p = .50, 
𝑝
2  = .05. Whilst the statistics indicate that the groups did not differ on 
their sense of being involved in the story, ratings were generally quite low, suggesting that 
participants only moderately felt a part of the story. Descriptive statistics can be found in 
Table 9. 
Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics for Degree to Which Participants Felt a Part of Narratives 
Narrative  
Experimenter 
M (SD) 
Self 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
Shame 
2.91 (1.04) 
3.27 (.91) 
3.45 (.82) 
3.55 (1.13) 
3.64 (.92) 
3.36 (1.12) 
 
 A 2 (emotion: neutral, shame) by 3 (condition: experimenter, self and neutral) mixed 
ANOVA for the degree to which participants felt absorbed in the story produced no main 
effects for emotion, F (1, 30) = 1.57, p = .22, 
𝑝
2 = .05, or condition, F (2, 30) = .46, p = .64, 
Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics for State Shame across Conditions 
Condition 
Baseline 
M (SD) 
Shame 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
M (SD) 
Experimenter .95 (.20) .92 (.22) .83 (.17) 
Self .83 (.19) .92 (.24) .74 (.13) 
Neutral .89 (.24) 1.03 (.26) .85 (.15) 
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
𝑝
2  = .03. Moreover, there was no significant interaction effect for emotion by condition, F (2, 
30) = .52, p = .60, 
𝑝
2  = .03. Again, whilst the statistics indicate that the groups did not differ 
on their sense of being absorbed in the story; ratings were generally quite low, suggesting that 
participants only moderately felt absorbed in the story. Descriptive statistics can be found in 
Table 10. 
Table 10  
Descriptive Statistics for Degree to Which Participants Felt Absorbed in Narratives 
Narrative 
 Experimenter 
M (SD) 
Self 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
Shame 
2.91 (1.22) 
3.45 (.82) 
3.27 (1.19) 
3.55 (1.21) 
3.55 (1.13) 
3.55 (.93) 
 
3.2 Test of Hypothesis One - If eye gaze diversion is associated with shame generally, or 
more associated with internal shame, or external shame 
 Four participants were omitted due to eye gaze not being adequately recorded (e.g. 
camera too low to record eyes). A 2 (emotion: neutral, shame) by 3 (condition: experimenter, 
self and neutral) mixed ANOVA for gaze diversion for spoken sentences produced a main 
effect for emotion, F (1, 26) = 6.43, p = .02, 
𝑝
2 = .20. Gaze diversion was significantly 
higher when verbalising the shame narrative than the neutral narrative. There were no main 
effects for condition, F (2, 26) = .31, p = .74, 
𝑝
2  = .02. No significant emotion by condition 
interaction was found, F (2, 26) = .82, p = .45, 
𝑝
2  = .06. These results indicate participants’ 
frequency of gaze diversion was higher when verbalising shame narrative than neutral 
narrative. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 11. 
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Table 11  
Descriptive Statistics for Gaze Diversion whilst Verbalising Shame or Neutral Narratives  
Narrative 
 Experimenter 
M (SD) 
Self 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
Shame 
 2.4 (3.03) 2.11 (5.01) .50 (.71) 
 3.1 (3.87) 3.11 (5.80) 2.70 (2.71) 
 
 To directly test hypothesis one for shame sentences verbalised, a one-way ANOVA 
was conducted. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 12. No main effect for condition 
was found, F (2, 26) = .03, p = .97, 
𝑝
2  = .00. This result indicates there was no difference in 
frequency of eye gaze diversion across the three conditions when verbalising shame 
sentences.  
Table 12 
Gaze Diversion Frequency for Verbalised Shame Sentences 
  
Experimenter 
M (SD) 
Self 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
M (SD) 
Gaze Diversion 3.10 (3.87) 3.11 (5.80) 2.70 (2.71) 
 
 A mixed ANOVA for gaze diversion for verbalised sentences for both shame and 
shame equivalent sentences found a significant effect for emotion, F (1, 26) = 7.27, p = .01, 

𝑝
2  = .22; indicating eye gaze diversion was higher when verbalising the shame sentences 
compared to shame equivalent sentences (see Table 13). However, there were no main effects 
for condition, F (2, 26) = .28, p = .76, 
𝑝
2  = .02. This indicates eye gaze diversion did not 
differ significantly across conditions during spoken sentences when the shame and shame-
equivalent sentences were collapsed together. No significant emotion by condition interaction 
effect was found, F (2, 26) = .30, p = .74, 
𝑝
2  = .02.  
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Table 13 
Gaze Diversion for Verbalised Sentences for Shame and Shame Equivalent Sentences 
Sentences 
 Experimenter 
M (SD) 
Self 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
M (SD) 
Shame Equivalent  1.30 (1.42) 1.00 (2.35) .40 (.70) 
Shame  2.00 (2.16) 1.67 (3.57) 1.60 (1.65) 
 
 To determine whether verbalised shame sentences in shame narrative had higher eye 
gaze diversion than verbalised: 1) shame equivalent sentences in the neutral narrative, 2) 
neutral sentences in the neutral narrative, 3) neutral sentences in the shame narrative, 4) 
residual sentences in the neutral narrative, and 5) residual sentences in the shame narrative, a 
repeated measures ANOVA was computed. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 14. A 
main effect was found, F (5, 24) = 8.85, p = .00, 
𝑝
2  = .24. Eye gaze diversion during the 
verbalised shame sentences in the shame narrative were significantly higher than neutral 
sentences in the neutral narrative, F (1, 28) = 12.20, p = .002, 
𝑝
2  = .30; neutral sentences in 
the shame narrative, F (1, 28) = 9.60, p = .004, 
𝑝
2  = .26; shame equivalent sentences in the 
neutral narrative, F (1, 28) = 7.79, p = .01, 
𝑝
2  = .22; residual sentences in the neutral 
narrative, F (1, 28) = 15.95, p = .00, 
𝑝
2  = .36; and residual sentences in the shame narrative, 
F (1, 28) = 15.21, p = .001, 
𝑝
2  = .35. This indicates gaze diversion was significantly higher 
when verbalising shame sentences in the shame narrative compared to all other sentence 
types in both shame and neutral narratives.   
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Table 14 
Descriptive Statistics for Gaze Diversion  
  
 M (SD) 
Shame Narrative - Shame Sentences 1.76 (2.46) 
.90 (1.59) 
.34 (.55) 
.34 (.77) 
.41 (.95) 
.24 (.70) 
Neutral Narrative - Shame Equivalent Sentences 
Shame Narrative - Neutral Sentences 
Neutral Narrative - Neutral Sentences 
Shame Narrative - Residual Sentences 
Neutral Narrative - Residual Sentences 
 
3.3 Test of Hypothesis Two - Dissociation will increase after the shame induction  
 Mixed ANOVA examined PDEQ scores (see Table 15) for condition (experimenter, 
self, and neutral) by emotion (neutral narrative and shame narrative) and produced a 
significant main effect for emotion, F (1, 30) = 11.21, p = .002, 
𝑝
2 = .27. PDEQ scores were 
significantly higher after verbalising the shame narrative than the neutral narrative. There was 
a non-significant trend for condition, F (2, 30) = 2.66, p = .09, 
𝑝
2  = .15. Post hoc tests show 
higher PDEQ scores in the neutral compared to the self condition (p = .03). No significant 
emotion by condition interaction were found, F (2, 30) = .79, p = .46, 
𝑝
2  = .05.  This 
indicates participants’ experienced higher levels of dissociation after verbalising the shame 
narrative compared to the neutral narrative. 
 
Table 15  
Descriptive Statistics for Modified PDEQ across Conditions 
Condition 
Shame 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
M (SD) 
Experimenter 1.14 (.11) 1.10 (.17) 
Self 1.11 (.17) 1.00 (.10) 
Neutral 1.24 (.21) 1.15 (.14) 
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3.4 Test of Hypothesis Three - Intrusions will be higher following experimenter and self 
condition compared to the neutral condition. 
 A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine if differences existed across conditions 
in the extent participants recorded their thoughts/feelings/memories about the narratives in 
the diary. No significant difference between conditions was found, F (2, 15) = .10, p = .91. 
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 16. This indicates participants were able to record 
their thoughts/feelings/memories to a comparable extent across conditions. 
 
 To determine whether intrusions were more frequent on day one or two across 
experimenter, self or neutral screen conditions a mixed ANOVA for Day (one, two) by 
condition was conducted on intrusions and frequency.  Descriptive statistics can be found in 
Table 17. A main effect for intrusion frequency was found, F (1, 22) = 9.80, p = .005, 
𝑝
2  = 
.31, which indicates that the frequency of intrusions were significantly higher on day one. No 
main effect was found for condition, F (1, 22) = 1.37, p = .28, 
𝑝
2  = .11, indicating there was 
no significant difference between condition for frequency of intrusions. No significant 
intrusion frequency by condition effect was found, F (2, 22) = .76, p = .48, 
𝑝
2  = .07. This 
suggests while intrusion frequency decreased on day two, there was no influence of 
condition. 
 
Table 16  
Descriptive Statistics for the Extent Participants Felt they were able to Record all their 
Thoughts/Feelings/Memories 
Condition M (SD) 
Experimenter 7 (1.41) 
Self 7.2 (3.42) 
Neutral 6.57 (2.64) 
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Table 17  
Descriptive Statistics for Intrusion Frequency across Conditions 
Intrusions Condition M (SD) 
Day 1 Experimenter 1.57 (1.51) 
2.43 (1.81) 
1.45 (.93) 
.71 (.76) 
1.43 (1.13) 
1.09 (.54) 
 Self 
 Neutral 
Day 2 Experimenter 
 Self 
 Neutral 
 
 To determine whether intrusion distress for day one or two was higher in the 
experimenter, self or neutral screen condition a mixed ANOVA for Day (one, two) by 
condition was conducted on intrusion distress.  Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 
18. No main effect of intrusion distress, F (1, 22) = .19, p = .67, 
𝑝
2  = .01; or condition, F (2, 
22) = 2.18, p = .14, 
𝑝
2  = .17 was found. Furthermore, no intrusion distress by condition 
interaction was found, F (2, 22) = 2.36, p = .12, 
𝑝
2  = .18, suggesting participants’ distress 
remained similar across day one and two. 
Table 18  
Descriptive Statistics for Intrusion Distress across Conditions 
Distress Condition M (SD) 
Day 1 Experimenter 1.43 (1.62) 
1.86 (2.21) 
3.33 (2.05) 
1.21 (1.32) 
2.26 (1.80) 
2.94 (1.98) 
 Self 
 Neutral 
Day 2 Experimenter 
 Self 
 Neutral 
 
  
47 
 
CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
 The aim of the current study was to use an experimental design to address the nature of 
eye gaze diversion during shame induction, and shame’s association with dissociation and 
ongoing intrusive thoughts in a sample of individuals in counselling for psychological 
problems. Three hypotheses were derived. During shame induction, participants looking at 
themselves or the experimenter would 1) divert their gaze most, 2) have the highest 
dissociation and 3) have more intrusive memories of the shame scenario. Overall, it was 
found that gaze diversion occurred more frequently when participants verbalised shame 
narratives, than when verbalising neutral narratives. Results indicated however that 
participants diverted eye gaze similarly when required to look into the eyes of the 
experimenter, their own eyes (via a mirror), or a neutral screen. Additionally, while it was 
found that state dissociation increased following shame inductions, dissociation was 
comparable across all three conditions. Lastly, there was no difference across conditions for 
intrusion distress or frequency following experimental procedure. Taken together, the results 
of the current study do not support the hypotheses that eye gaze diversion, dissociation and 
intrusions would be higher while looking at experimenter or oneself compared to a neutral 
screen. However, the results do show that in the shame narratives increased eye gaze 
diversion and dissociation was evident, suggesting that verbalising a shame narrative, 
regardless of context produces gaze diversion and dissociation.  
4.1 Overall findings 
4.1.1 Experimental Condition Characteristics and Manipulation Checks 
 Analysis revealed no significant differences in age and sex across the three conditions, 
indicating any effects seen in the current study were due to the experimental manipulation, 
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rather than these individual demographic factors. Self-reported emotion ratings were 
significantly higher after the shame induction, as was shame as a specific emotion.  
Additionally, state shame scores were significantly higher following the shame narrative. 
However, there was no significant difference across conditions for shame scores following 
the shame narrative. This suggests the shame manipulation was effective in inducing shame.  
 Participants reported a moderate level of feeling a part of and absorbed in narratives. 
This did not differ between narratives or across conditions. Therefore, the manipulation 
checks indicate the shame inductions were successful and the resulting findings seen in the 
current study are due to experimental manipulation.  
4.1.2 Eye Gaze Diversion and Shame  
 The current study demonstrated that more gaze diversion resulted from the shame 
narrative compared to the neutral narrative. Supporting this, gaze diversion was also higher 
when participants verbalised shame sentences compared to shame equivalent, neutral and 
residual sentences. This finding is consistent with McKendry’s (2013) study, which 
employed a similar methodology to that utilised in the current study, whereby occurrences of 
gaze diversion were similarly greater during the shame narrative and when participants 
verbalised shame sentences. Taken together these findings are in line with shame literature to 
date, which suggests eye gaze diversion is a common behavioural symptom of shame (e.g., 
Keltner, 1995; Tracy & Robins, 2007; Martens, Tracy, & Shariff, 2012). Yet contrary to 
hypothesis one, eye gaze diversion did not significantly differ across the three conditions for 
shame narratives or shame sentences. Therefore indicating comparable eye gaze diversion 
occurrences regardless of whether participants verbalised the shame narrative while looking 
at themselves in the mirror, at the experimenter, or the neutral screen; suggesting eye gaze 
diversion did not differentiate internal and external shame. Again, this is consistent with 
McKendry’s (2013) findings that also found no significant differences across conditions. 
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These findings indicate eye gaze diversion is associated with general shame, rather than 
shame that may be internally or externally driven. This is expected as literature has suggested 
there is usually a connection between internal and external shame cognitions (Goss, Gilbert 
and Allan, 1994; Gilbert et al., 2010). That is, when one has feelings of inadequacy of one’s 
self, they expect others to see them in the same way, and vice-versa. Although participants 
engaging in gaze diversion while looking at themselves in the mirror would commonly reflect 
internal shame, it is also possible there was an aspect of external shame present. This is 
speculated on the participant being aware of the experimenter’s presence, as well as knowing 
they were being video recorded, both of which may have elicited some degree of external 
shame and potentially confounded the results, leading to the lack of difference found. As 
there is the possibility that external shame was present in the presumed internal shame 
condition, the results of this condition could be in part due to external shame and show an 
accumulation of shame through internal and external sources as opposed to being exclusively 
internally driven. As it is suggested gaze diversion may be used as a way to reduce negative 
feelings of exposure and ultimately reduce experiences of shame (Kleinke, 1986), it is 
conceivable participants (including those looking at their mirror image) diverted their gaze as 
they verbalised shame sentences (e.g., wiping nasal mucus from your face) to avoid any 
perceived judgements by the experimenter. But despite the potential explanation offered by 
the ‘external’ shame hypothesis for gaze diversion in the internal shame condition, it does not 
offer a full account, because in the internal shame condition the participants were only 
looking at themselves, and so diverted gaze away from themselves, not the researcher of 
some perceived other. Thus, it is possible that both external and internal shame evokes the 
same or similar degree of gaze diversion as may have been found in the current study.  
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4.1.3 State Dissociation and Shame 
Results from the current study also indicate that while state dissociation did increase 
following the shame induction compared to the neutral induction, levels of state dissociation 
did not differ with regard to whether participants viewed the experimenter, the mirror image 
of themselves or the neutral screen, contrary to hypothesis two. This suggests as there was no 
significant difference across conditions, the scenarios themselves were powerful enough to 
induce dissociative experiences. In short, state dissociation is responsive to shame. This is 
concurrent with literature to date suggesting dissociation may be employed to modulate or 
eradicate one’s experience of shame (Feiring, Taska, & Lewis, 1996; Lewis, 1992). Matos 
and Pinto-Gouveia (2010) explored the nature of early shame experiences, their subsequent 
characteristics as traumatic memories and their association with dissociative symptomology. 
They reported shame’s frequent association with psychological disorders, (e.g., posttraumatic 
stress disorder, borderline personality disorder and eating disorders) noting that such 
disorders often include an aspect of dissociation. The current sample of treatment-attending 
participants may not reflect people in the general population and may present a higher 
proneness to shame and dissociation. However, results show that while shame experiences 
are induced, dissociation appears to heighten, and may act as a means to combat or alleviate 
unwanted negative experiences (e.g. shame) within the current sample. 
4.1.4 Intrusions and Shame 
 Intrusion frequency was higher on day one when compared to day two, although 
intrusion distress did not differ between days one and two.  Of interest, an analysis of 
intrusion distress and frequency revealed no significant differences between conditions, 
contrary to hypothesis three.  
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4.1.5 Qualitative Observations 
 A number of qualitative observations were made during the experimental procedure. 
These observations revealed that when participants were required to verbalise shame 
sentences some were unable to say the sentence correctly, and on occasion would 
mispronounce a word and have to correct it. It is possible that this occurred as a result of 
participants experiencing shame which prevented them from attending to what was being 
verbalised. Conversely, the mispronunciation or repetition of words may have decreased the 
impact of the narrative by reducing coherence and therefore absorption into the narrative. 
Additionally, some participants had a tendency to convert the sentences they were verbalising 
to past tense (e.g. I walked into my local bank) or second person (e.g. you walk into your 
local bank). These behaviours may have been a way in which participants could distance 
themselves from shame or minimise any negative emotions and therefore may have impacted 
the results to some degree. 
4.2. Practical and Theoretical Implications 
The findings presented in this study have potentially important implications regarding 
shame and could contribute to the existing body of research. Moreover, the current study 
indicates that eye gaze diversion is demonstrated equally across both shame-inducing 
evaluations of the self (i.e. internal shame) and evaluations from others (i.e. external shame); 
indicating eye gaze diversion is generally associated with shame rather than specifically 
internal or external shame. 
 The current study may aid in the treatment of mental health difficulties. Specifically, 
therapists should continue to be aware of gaze diversion as a behavioural marker for shame 
activation. Literature to date supports the notion that there are distinct non-verbal markers of 
shame, to which eye gaze diversion is included (i.e., Darwin, 1872; Izard, 1971; Keltner, 
1995; Martens, Tracy, & Shariff, 2012). The current study has indicated support for these 
52 
 
clinical observations. Gaze diversion as a result of shame appears to be pertinent when people 
are verbalising the most shameful parts of their own experience, as observed in the current 
study. Participants’ gaze diversion and therefore shame was found to be highest when 
verbalising the sentences of the narrative perceived as shameful in nature. This suggests that 
if therapists notice gaze diversion during specific parts of a narrative in therapy it may signal 
associated shame and therefore may need more therapeutic focus and attention to ameliorate.   
Another important implication to be taken from the current research regards 
dissociation and therapy. The ideas presented currently may aid in therapists being more 
mindful of occurrences of dissociation operating during shame narratives, which may inhibit 
the therapeutic processing of shameful experiences. The current study found for those 
currently in therapy, shame appears to be associated with dissociation experiences, as has 
been found in previous research and literature (Andrews, Valentine, & Valentine 1995; 
Harder & Lewis 1986; Matos & Pinto-Gouveia, 2010). Given this, a greater knowledge base 
concerning experiences of dissociation during therapy may aid therapists in recognising states 
of dissociation. Therefore, knowledge of the association between shame and dissociation may 
serve to improve therapeutic outcomes.  
4.3 Methodological considerations 
A number of methodological limitations can be identified in the present study. While 
both the shame and neutral narratives were generated to be similar in length and structure, 
sentence lengths within narratives varied, resulting in some sentences being much longer than 
others. While some participants stated having had difficulty retaining or recalling some 
sentences heard during the narratives, this was also evident in a number of recordings in 
which some participants repeated the sentences inaccurately, repeated the sentence partially 
or simply passed and chose not to verbalise the sentence at all. Additionally, non-verbal 
behaviours such as closing eyes, eyes fluttering, and smiling were observed while participants 
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were having difficulty repeating a longer sentence. Consequently, it is unclear as to whether 
the behaviours were reflecting an experience of shame due to induction or as a direct result of 
having difficulty verbalising the sentence. Therefore, it is advised any future replications of 
the current study may benefit from reducing longer sentences in order to reduce ambiguity of 
non-verbal behaviours and improve the effectiveness of the emotion inductions.  
Related to this, participants were asked to absorb themselves in the story as much as 
they could, while simultaneously retaining each sentence in order to verbalise it. 
Consequently, difficulty in repeating sentences may have detracted from participants’ 
abilities to immerse themselves fully in the story, thereby possibly reducing the effectiveness 
of the shame induction. It is likely greater immersion in narratives may result in greater 
differences across conditions. It is also conceivable some participants had difficulty repeating 
sentences as they were attending to the task of immersing themselves in the narrative (i.e., 
following the story). Requiring participants to recall sentences, and immerse themselves may 
have resulted in a high cognitive load for some, which may have compromised the results to 
some degree. Regardless, future replication of the current study may benefit from shortening 
sentence length; potentially allowing participants to immerse themselves in the narratives 
with more ease.  
Although distinctions between the definition of shame and embarrassment have been 
proposed, (e.g., Lewis, 1992; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988) some participants may be 
unaware of such distinctions and may use the two emotions interchangeably. Conversely, it 
has been proposed no clear distinction between shame and embarrassment has been 
established (Crozier, 2014). Therefore it is possible participants in the current study 
experienced shame as a direct result of the shame induction, however reported feeling 
embarrassment and vice-versa. The results in this study may have been different if 
participants were informed and aware of a distinction between shame and embarrassment. 
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This could be improved in future research by providing participants clear definitions of 
emotions (e.g., shame, embarrassment and guilt), which they are required to rate in a study. 
This may provide participants with a clearer understanding of emotions experienced and 
potentially improve their ability to communicate their experiences more clearly and in line 
with definitions present within psychometric scales. 
All participants were undergoing counselling for various reasons. Although this 
sample was deemed appropriate for this study, for the purposes of examining a clinical 
population, the sample was one of convenience. The results of this study therefore may not be 
generalizable to all populations. Studies looking at self-conscious emotions such as shame 
and experiences of dissociation would benefit from examining other populations, such as 
child samples, community samples and inpatient clinical populations. Additionally, while the 
current study did utilise a clinical sample, it is possible the sample represented a higher 
functioning (e.g., having the ability to maintain work) and readily accessible clinical 
population. Therefore, examining a clinical population within an inpatient setting (whereby 
participants overall may be less functional in the community), may provide further 
information from a more impaired clinical population. 
4.4 Future Research 
The current shame induction appeared to have a considerable emotional effect, as 
evidenced by significantly higher eye gaze diversion during the shame narrative. However, it 
is possible that differentiation between internal and external shame may have been evident 
with a more powerful shame induction. Matos and Pinto-Gouveia (2010) suggest shame is 
less of a general construct and more specific to internal and external shame. They found early 
shame experiences associated with participant’s current feelings of both internal and external 
shame in adulthood. Future researchers should therefore aim to utilise a shame induction that 
is potentially of a more shameful nature (see Appendix O) than the narrative used in the 
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current study, to assess whether there is greater differentiation between internal and external 
shame when more shame is induced. Alternatively, future research could examine several 
levels of shame induction then compare them to note whether effects are found, which may 
show that more shame leads to more negative outcomes or emotions experienced.  
A number of qualitative observations were made while undertaking the current study, 
which were not the focus of the experiment. Of particular note, participants appeared to make 
errors (e.g. mispronounce) when verbalising shame sentences. Additionally, non-verbal 
behaviours that were not the focus of the current study, such as postural changes and closed 
eyes also appeared to be affected by the shame induction compared with neutral induction. 
Slumped posture was more evident during the shame induction as was participants closing 
their eyes. It is possible that the previously mentioned behaviours occurred as a direct result 
of emotion induction and could provide further insight to the current literature on the non-
verbal behaviours of shame and may indicate additional behavioural strategies to minimise 
emotional responses, similar to diverting eye gaze or dissociation. As such, further research 
in this area could examine other possible non-verbal markers of shame such as posture and 
closed eyes. 
4.5 Conclusions 
 The current study aimed to address whether the nature of eye gaze diversion was 
generally associated with shame or more specifically related to internal and external shame. 
Additionally, the research examined levels of state dissociation following a shame induction. 
Lastly, intrusive thoughts and subsequent distress was assessed as a function of shame 
induction. Several analyses reached significance, indicating eye gaze diversion was highest 
during shame induction and reflected a general association with shame. State dissociation 
was found to be significantly higher following the shame narrative compared with the neutral. 
Unexpectedly, it was found that there were no significant differences across conditions in 
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regards to intrusion frequency and distress. The results of the current study suggest eye gaze 
diversion is generally associated with shame. However, it remains unclear as to whether 
external shame was elicited having the experimenter in the room and being recorded. A 
number of methodological limitations in the current study may hinder the generalisability of 
findings, including definitions, participant sample and narrative engagement. Irrespective, the 
current study demonstrates important implications for the identification of shame and 
dissociation in therapy, which could lead to better therapeutic outcomes when considered, 
then targeted and may aid in the identification and validation of further shame behaviours. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
INVITATION LETTER 
 
Title: Self-conscious emotions, dissociation and cognition: an experimental investigation. 
 
We are conducting a research study looking at people’s responses to shame. This study  
may be of interest to you and more details can be found in this letter.  
 
This letter provides some information about the nature of the research and how to volunteer. 
Before you decide, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and 
what it will involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully and talk to 
others about the study if you wish. If you have any questions please ask either your therapist 
(who may have given you this letter) or contact Martin Dorahy (Clinical 
Psychologist/Associate Professor, University of Canterbury) or Amber Scott (Masters 
student, University of Canterbury). 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Firstly, we want to investigate whether or not experiences of dissociation occur during an 
induction of shame. We also want to understand how distressing the emotion of shame is by 
determining whether experiencing a low-level of shame result in later memories in 
participants. Data from this study will help understand people’s responses to shame. To do 
this, we are asking people who are currently seeking assistance for their difficulties if they 
would like to volunteer to help us with a study that looks at these issues. 
 
Do I have to take part?   
No, it is up to you whether you decide to take part.  If you do want to be involved, please put 
your name and preferred contact number on the reply slip below and give it to your therapist 
or Dr Martin Dorahy. If you decide not to take part this will be respected and understood and 
your therapy will not be affected. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to participate you will complete 4 questionnaires. You will also read 2 scenarios 
(one of a situation that some people may find embarrassing, and another of a neutral 
situation). You will read these while either looking at yourself in a mirror, looking at the 
researcher or looking at a neutral image. This part of the study will be video recorded and we 
will monitor your heart rate. Lastly, over the following 2 days you will be invited to keep a 
diary of any memories of the shame assessment you experience. It will take approximately 60 
minutes to complete the questionnaires and read the two scenarios, and then we will arrange 
to meet up briefly again 2 days later to speak with about your experience of being in the 
study. This will take approximately 10-15 minutes. You will be provided with petrol 
vouchers to assist your travel to the university, you will also be given a $10 food voucher as a 
way to thank you for your involvement. However, if you do not drive you may opt for food 
vouchers instead. 
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Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Yes. All the information about your participation in this study will be kept confidential.  
 
Contact Details: 
You are free to ask any further questions to your therapist, the researcher (Amber Scott), or 
Dr Martin Dorahy. If you are interested in participating in this research, please complete the 
reply slip below and give it to your therapist. 
 
Dr Martin Dorahy Amber Scott 
Phone:    03-3643416 (Extn:3416)  Phone: 022 3711628 
Email:    martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz Email:  amber.scott@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Reply Slip 
 
I consent to be contacted by a member of the Research team about the research project:  
 
 
 
Signed (participant):  __________________ Date: ____________________ 
 
 
 
Print name (participant): __________________ Telephone: _______________ 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Department of Psychology 
Master’s Thesis 
Information Sheet  
 
 
 
You are invited to participate in the research project “Self-conscious emotions, dissociation 
and cognition: an experimental investigation’. This project is being carried out as a 
requirement for the course PSYC690: MA Thesis. It is intended the results of this project will 
be published as part of a thesis, with the possibility of also being published in a journal. Your 
participation is completely voluntary, and you may at any time withdraw from the project, 
including withdrawal of any information you have provided, without any negative 
consequence to yourself. Please note that data is not able to be withdrawn from the research 
once it is entered into the computer system as it will become anonymous. 
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
Firstly, we want to investigate whether or not experiences of dissociation occur during an 
induction of shame, through the monitoring of heart rate, heart rate variation and self-report 
during shame induction. Furthermore, we want to corroborate findings regarding eye-gaze 
diversion during stories that some people may find embarrassing. We finally want to 
understand how distressing the emotion of shame is by determining whether the stories result 
in later memories for participants. Data from this study will help understand people’s 
responses to shame. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to participate you will complete four questionnaires, read two scenarios aloud 
whilst being video recorded (shame induction) and lastly, over the following 2 days keep a 
diary of any memories you experience. The schedule and approximate times are listed below: 
  
Measure/Assessment Approximate Time 
Dissociative Experiences Scale 5 minutes 
Experience of Shame Scale 5 minutes 
Shame Induction (video recorded) 10 minutes 
Peritraumatic Dissociative Experiences Questionnaire 5 Minutes 
State Shame and Guilt Scale 5 minutes 
Intrusion Dairy Over a 2 day period 
 
What do I have to do? 
You just simply have to respond to the questions in the questionnaires as best you can. Before 
reading the stories wires will be placed on you so your physiological responses can be 
measured e.g. heart rate. You will wear a set of headphones through which you will hear the 
scenarios, we ask that you repeat each part of the scenario in first person (i.e. you may hear 
“you walk up to…” but you will say “I walk up to”). While repeating the scenarios we ask 
you look straight ahead of you. Finally, following the shame induction we ask you to keep a 
diary for two days of whether you have any intrusions (e.g. thoughts, memories, feelings 
related to the content of the induction). During this time we ask that you record both the time 
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and a brief description of each intrusion. In addition, for each intrusion we require you to rate 
the severity of your emotional experience on a scale ranging from 0 (“totally relaxed, no 
shame feelings”) to 10 (“highest shame you have ever felt”). After which you will return your 
diary back to the experimenter. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part?  
While you will not be asked to describe any events you may find distressing, you will be 
repeating a potentially embarrassing scenario. Some people may find this distressing. A list 
of support services is included at the end of this sheet in case you find that helpful. You can 
also speak to you counsellor about your experience. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept completely confidential? 
You can be assured of the complete confidentiality of the data gathered in this investigation. 
To ensure confidentiality no names will be used on the assessments or in the final report. You 
are welcome to request a copy of all assessments you complete and subsequent findings 
within the study.  
 
This project is being carried out by Amber Scott under the supervision of Dr Martin Dorahy. 
Either will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the 
project. Contact details are as follows: 
 
Dr Martin Dorahy Amber Scott 
Phone:    03-3643416 (Extn:3416)  Phone: 022 3711628 
Email:    martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz Email:  amber.scott@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
 
Human Ethics Committee: 
Postal: Okeover House, University of Canterbury, Ilam, 8041, Christchurch 
Email: human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz  
 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee. Human Ethics Committee Principles and Guidelines 12. Ref: 2013/42. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
Department of Psychology 
Master’s Thesis 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
“Self-conscious emotions, dissociation and cognition: an experimental investigation” 
 
 
I have read and understood the description of the above named project. I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. On this basis, I agree 
to participate, with the understanding that confidentiality will be preserved. 
 
I understand also that I may at any time withdraw from the project, including withdrawal of 
any information I have provided, without any negative consequence to myself. 
 
I consent to the research being videotaped. 
 
I also consent to my data being merged with all the other data. 
 
I note that the project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee (Ref: 2013/42). 
 
 
 
Full Name (please print):  ____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Signature:    ____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Date:      ____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
  
74 
 
APPENDIX D 
 
HELPFUL CONTACTS 
 
SUPPORT SERVICES 
Samaritans: 0800 726 666  
 
Lifeline: 0800 543 354; (03) 366 6743 
Warmline: 0800 899 276 
 
COUNSELLING SERVICES 
Petersgate Counselling Service: (03) 343 3391 
 
EMERGENCY SERVICES 
 
Psychiatric Emergency Services: (03) 364 0482 
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APPENDIX E 
HUMAN ETHICS COMMITTEE  
 
Secretary, Lynda Griffioen  
Email: human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz  
 
 
Ref: HEC 2013/42  
 
 
15 May 2013  
 
 
 
 
Amber Scott  
Department of Psychology  
UNIVERSITY OF 
CANTERBURY  
 
 
 
 
Dear Amber  
 
The Human Ethics Committee advises that your research proposal "Self-conscious emotions,  
dissociation and cognition: an experimental investigation" has been considered and approved.  
 
Please note that this approval is subject to the incorporation of the amendments you have provided  
in your email of 14 May 2013.  
 
Best wishes for your project.  
 
 
Yours sincerely  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lindsey MacDonald  
Chair  
University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Canterbury Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140, New Zealand. www.canterbury.ac.nz  
 
  
76 
 
APPENDIX F 
 
Dissociative Experiences Scale 
 
These questions describe experiences that you may have in your daily life.  Your answer should show 
how often these experiences happen to you when you ARE NOT under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs.  CIRCLE a number from 0% to 100% to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.  
If it happens 45% of the time, circle both 40% and 50%. 
 
       
 
1. Some people have the experience of driving or riding in a car or bus or subway and suddenly realising 
that they don’t remember what has happened during all or part of the trip. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
2. Some people find that sometimes they are listening to someone talk and they suddenly realise that they 
did not hear part or all of what was said. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
3. Some people have the experience of finding themselves in a place and having no idea how they got there. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
4. Some people have the experience of finding themselves dressed in clothes that they don’t remember 
putting on. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
5. Some people have the experience of finding new things among their belongings that they do not 
remember buying. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
6. Some people sometimes find that they are approached by people that they do not know who call them by 
another name or insist that they have met them before. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
7. Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling as though they are standing next to themselves or 
watching themselves do something and they actually see themselves as if they were looking at another 
person. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
8. Some people are told that they sometimes do not recognise friends or family members. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
9. Some people find that they have no memory for some important events in their lives (for example, a 
wedding or graduation). 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
10. Some people have the experience of being accused of lying when they do not think that they have lied. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
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11. Some people have the experience of looking in a mirror and not recognising themselves. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
12. Some people have the experience of feeling that other people, objects and the world around them are not    
       real. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
13. Some people have the experience of feeling that their body does not seem to belong to them. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
14. Some people have the experience of sometimes remembering a past event so vividly that they feel as if 
      they were reliving that event. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
15. Some people have the experience of not being sure whether things that they remember happening really    
      did happen or whether they just dreamed them. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
16. Some people have the experience of being in a familiar place but finding it strange and unfamiliar. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
  
17. Some people find that when they are watching television or a movie they become so absorbed in the   
      story that they are unaware of other events happening around them. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
18. Some people find that they become so involved in a fantasy or daydream that it feels as though it were  
      really happening to them. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
19. Some people find that they sometimes are able to ignore pain. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
20. Some people find that they sometimes sit staring off into space, thinking of nothing, and are not aware of  
       the passage of time. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
21. Some people sometimes find that when they are alone they talk out loud to themselves. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
22. Some people find that in one situation they may act so differently compared with another  situation  
       that they feel almost as if they were two different people. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
23. Some people sometimes find that in certain situations they are able to do things with amazing ease and  
      spontaneity that would usually be difficult for them (for example, sports, work, social situations, etc.). 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
24. Some people sometimes find that they cannot remember whether they have done something or have just   
      thought about doing this (for example, not knowing whether they have just mailed a letter or have just  
      thought about mailing it). 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
25. Some people find evidence that they have done things that they do not remember doing. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
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26. Some people sometimes find writings, drawings, or notes among their belongings that they must have   
      done but cannot remember doing. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
27. Some people sometimes find that they hear voices inside their head that tell them to do things or  
      comment on things that they are doing. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
 
28. Some people sometimes feel as if they are looking at the world through a fog so that people and objects  
      appear far away or unclear. 
 (NEVER)       0%       10       20       30       40       50       60       70       80       90       100       (ALWAYS) 
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APPENDIX G 
Experience of Shame Scale 
 
 
Everybody at times can feel embarrassed, self-conscious or ashamed.  These questions are about such 
feelings if they have occurred at any time in the past year.  There are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers.  
Please indicate the response which applies to you with a tick. 
 
 
 
1. Have you felt ashamed of any of your personal          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    ) 
 habits? 
 
2. Have you worried about what other people          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    )
 think of any of your personal habits?  
 
3. Have you tried to cover up or conceal any of your        (    )            (    )            (    )            (    )  
 personal habits? 
 
4. Have you felt ashamed of your manner with          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    )
 others?  
 
5. Have you worried about what other people           (    )            (    )            (    )            (    )  
 think of your manner with others? 
 
6. Have you avoided people because of your manner?      (    )            (    )            (    )            (    ) 
 
7. Have you felt ashamed of the sort of person          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    )
 you are?   
 
8. Have you worried about what other people think          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    )
 of the sort of person you are? 
 
9. Have you tried to conceal from others the sort of          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    ) 
 person you are? 
 
10. Have you felt ashamed of your ability to do          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    ) 
 things? 
 
11. Have you worried about what other people          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    ) 
 think of your ability to do things?  
 
12. Have you avoided people because of your                    (    )            (    )            (    )            (    ) 
 inability to do things?                                                          
 
13. Do you feel ashamed when you do something          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    ) 
 wrong? 
 
14. Have you worried about what other people          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    ) 
 think of you when you do something wrong?     
 
 Not at                                    Very 
    All         A Little   Moderately   Much 
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15. Have you tried to cover up or conceal things           (    )            (    )            (    )            (    )
 you felt ashamed of having done?   
    
16. Have you felt ashamed when you said                       (    )            (    )            (    )            (    ) 
 something stupid? 
 
17. Have you worried about what other people          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    )
 think of you when you said something stupid? 
 
18. Have you avoided contact with anyone who           (    )            (    )            (    )            (    ) 
 knew you said something stupid? 
 
19. Have you felt ashamed when you failed at                     (    )            (    )            (    )            (    ) 
 something which was important to you? 
 
20. Have you worried about what other people          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    )
 think of you when you fail?   
 
21. Have you avoided people who have seen you          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    ) 
 fail? 
 
22. Have you felt ashamed of your body or any          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    ) 
 part of it? 
  
23. Have you worried about what other people          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    )
 think of your appearance? 
 
24. Have you avoided looking at yourself in the          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    )
 mirror?   
 
25. Have you wanted to hide or conceal your body          (    )            (    )            (    )            (    )
 or any part of it? 
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APPENDIX H 
Peritraumatic Dissociative Experiences 
Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: Please complete the items below by circling the choice that best describes your 
experiences and reactions during the audio clip and immediately afterward.  If an item does 
not apply to your experience, please circle “Not at all true.”                   
 
        Very much true   
  
  
  
  
  
      Fairly true   
  
  
  
  
    Somewhat true   
  
  
  
  Not very true   
  
  
Not at all true   
              
 
 
1. I had moments of losing track of what was going on – 
I “blanked out” or felt separate from what was going on. 
       1    2 3   4 5 
2. My sense of time changed – things seemed to be 
happening in slow motion. 
       1    2 3   4 5 
3. I felt as though I were a spectator watching what was 
happening to me, as if I were floating above the scene or 
observing it as an outsider. 
       1    2 3   4 5 
4. There were moments when my sense of my own body 
seemed distorted or changed. I felt disconnected from my 
own body, or that it was unusually large or small. 
       1    2 3   4 5 
5. I felt as though things that were actually happening to 
others were happening to me – like I was being trapped 
when I really wasn’t. 
       1    2 3   4 5 
6. I felt confused; that is; there were moments when I had 
difficulty making sense of what was happening. 
       1    2 3   4 5 
7. I felt disoriented; that is, there were moments when I 
felt uncertain about where I was or what time it was. 
       1    2 3   4 5 
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8. I have gaps in my memory and cannot                                             1       2       3        4        5 
remember parts of the experiment. 
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APPENDIX I 
State Shame and Guilt Scale 
 
 
The following are some statements which may or may not describe how you are feeling right now.  
Please rate each statement using the 5-point scale below.  Remember to rate each statement based on 
how you are feeling right at this moment. 
 
 
Not feeling this way at all               Feeling this way somewhat               Feeling this way very strongly                                                
 
                      1 ------------------ 2 ------------------ 3 ------------------- 4 ------------------- 5 
 
 
 
1.   I feel good about myself.                                                   
               
2.   I want to sink into the floor and disappear.                         
   
3.   I feel remorse, regret.                                                           
      
4.   I feel worthwhile, valuable.                                                           
 
5.   I feel small.                                                                                    
  
6.   I feel tension about something I have done.                                  
 
7.   I feel capable, useful.                                                                     
  
8.   I feel like I am a bad person.                                                 
 
9.   I cannot stop thinking about something bad I have 
done.                                                                                    
 
10. I feel proud.                                                                                    
  
11. I feel humiliated, disgraced.                                                      
 
12. I feel like apologizing, confessing.                                                    
 
13. I feel pleased about something I have done.                                
 
14. I feel worthless, powerless.                                                           
               
15. I feel bad about something I have done.                                
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
 
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
 
1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 
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APPENDIX J - Shame and Control Narratives 
 
Scenario + Control 
Scenario One – Bank 
- You go into your local Bank (Line 1) 
- You walk up to a free Teller (Line 2) 
- You ask to withdraw $100 (Line 3) 
- As you stand there, you notice the Teller staring at your face (Line 4) 
- The Teller begins to smirk (Line 5) 
- The Teller points to your face and mentions you have nasal mucus on your cheek 
(Line 6) 
- You quickly get a tissue from your pocket to wipe your face clean (Line 7) 
- Before you can do so, another Teller nearby laughs mockingly at you (Line 8) 
- You wipe the mucus off (Line 9) 
- You feel vulnerable, inferior and exposed (Line 10) 
- You wish you could dig yourself into a hole (Line 11) 
- You take the $100 in a rush and head for the door (Line 12) 
- On the way out you can sense the Tellers talking about you (Line 13) 
- You leave the bank (Line 14) 
 
Scenario One – Bank (Control) 
- You go into your local Bank (Line 1) 
- You walk up to a free Teller (Line 2) 
- You ask to withdraw $100 (Line 3) 
- As you stand there, you make conversation with the Teller (Line 4) 
- The Teller begins to smile (Line 5) 
- The Teller points to your withdrawal slip and asks you to sign it (Line 6) 
- You notice you haven’t and get a pen from your pocket (Line 7) 
- As you do another teller nearby smiles warmly at you (Line 8) 
- You sign the withdrawal form (Line 9) 
- You feel comfortable and relaxed in the bank (Line 10) 
- You wished you had more time to talk to the teller (Line 11) 
- You take the $100 and head for the door (Line 12) 
- On the way out you say goodbye to the Tellers  (Line 13) 
- You leave the bank (Line 14) 
 
 
Neutral Shame/Shame Equivalent Residual Shame/Residual Shame Equivalent  
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APPENDIX K 
 
Intrusion Diary 
 
 
Over the next 2 days please take the time to fill out the following intrusion diary (starting as 
soon as you leave today).  
 
Intrusions are any thoughts/memories/images about the scenario you read, occurring when 
you had not intended to think about the scenario.  
 
Each time this happens please note the time that it occurred, rate the level of distress (using 
the ratings below) and briefly describe its contents in the table on the next page. 
 
0: Totally relaxed, no shame feelings. 
1: Alert and awake, concentrating well. 
2: Minimal shame. 
3: Mild shame, no interference with performance. 
4: Somewhat upset to the point that you cannot easily ignore an unpleasant thought. You can  
    handle it OK but don’t feel good. 
5: Moderate shame, uncomfortable but can continue to perform. 
6: Feeling bad to the point that you begin to think something ought to be done about the way   
    you feel. 
7: Quite shamed, interfering with performance. 
8: Very shamed, can’t concentrate. 
9: Extremely shamed. 
10: Highest shame that you have ever felt. 
 
 
 
Date and Time 
How distressing was 
it? 
0----------------10 
Description of its 
contents 
Day 1    
Day 2    
To what extent did you feel you were able to record all your intrusive memories in the diary? 
 
0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10 
Never remembered to                                                                                   Always remembered to 
write down the intrusion                                                                 write down the intrusion 
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APPENDIX L 
 
 
Department of Psychology 
Master’s Thesis 
  
 
 
DEBRIEF SHEET 
 
 
The current study aimed to investigate whether or not experiences of detachment from one’s 
self (dissociation) occurred during an assessment of shame, through the monitoring of 
people’s heart rate and how much their heart rate varies in the speed it beats. Furthermore, we 
wanted to corroborate previous findings regarding your eye movements when you heard the 
story about being in the bank i.e. was where you looked generally or specifically related to 
internal (negative judgments from yourself – looking in mirror) or external (negative 
judgments from others – looking at researcher) shame. This is why we video-taped you 
reading the scenario, so we could understand when your gaze shifted and when it did not. We 
finally wanted to examine shame as a distressing experience by establishing whether the 
shame assessments resulted in later intrusions (thoughts, memories, feelings related to the 
content of the induction) in participants. 
 
As a participant, you were required to sit in front of a one-way mirror, and repeat out loud 
scenarios while either, 1) looking at yourself in the mirror, 2) looking at the researcher 
through the screen or 3) looking at a neutral image on the screen, whilst being recorded.  This 
allowed us to count the number of times you diverted your gaze from the screen within each 
condition. You were also required to complete four questionnaires that assessed shame and 
dissociation before and after the shame assessment. Your level of dissociative experiences 
were also assessed through measuring your bodily responses e.g. heart rate. Finally, you 
recorded any intrusions you experienced over a 2 day period, as well as the degree of emotion 
you felt at the time. 
 
We have hypothesized dissociation during shame assessment will be higher in participants 
who looked at themselves in a mirror (internalised shame) or at the experimenter through the 
window (externalised shame) than the neutral condition of looking at a neutral image. We 
also hypothesize individuals will divert their gaze more when looking at themselves or the 
experimenter than compared to the neutral condition. Lastly, it is predicted participants 
looking at themselves or the experimenter will have more memories of the shame scenario 
over a period of two days following the study, than those participants in the neutral condition. 
 
The information provided by you and other participants may not be of direct benefit to you, 
but may help in understanding more about responses to emotions, which we hope to apply in 
the therapeutic setting to help people with emotional problems. 
 
 
Thank you for your participation in this study, your input is very much appreciated by the 
research team.  If you are interested in obtaining a copy of the research when it is completed, 
please feel free to contact the primary researcher. 
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APPENDIX M - Experimental Set-Up 
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APPENDIX N - Non-Verbal Coding Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Coding Narrative Line Number Word/Phrase 
Forehead    
Wrinkles    
Gaze Diversion    
Left    
Right    
Up    
Down    
Eyes    
Eyes Tighten/Narrow    
Eyes Widen    
Eyes Closed    
Double Blink    
Wink    
Eyes Flutter    
Eye Brows    
Brow Lower    
Brow Raise    
Inner Brow Raise    
Outer Brow Raise    
Nose    
            Wrinkles Nose    
Mouth    
Corners of Mouth Drop    
Corners of Mouth Raise    
Lip Suck    
Lips Part    
Lips Tighten    
Lip Corner Pulled – Left    
Lip Corner Pulled – Right    
Lip Pucker    
Lip Wipe    
Lip Bite    
Tongue Out    
Swallows    
Sigh    
Cheeks/Jaw    
Cheeks Puff    
Cheek Suck    
Tongue Bulge     
Chin Raiser    
Jaw Clencher    
Jaw Sideways    
Jaw Drop    
Face touches    
Head Movement    
Left    
Right    
Tilt Up    
Tilt Down    
Mispronunciation    
Other 
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Appendix O - Alternative Shame and Control Narratives 
Bedroom - (shame) 
- You are in your bedroom, alone (Line 1) 
- You turn on your computer and begin to look through websites (Line 2) 
- You notice an advert for a site with images of naked people (Line 3) 
- You notice yourself getting sexually aroused (Line 4) 
- You become more curious about the site, as your arousal increases (Line 5) 
- Soon you want to put your hand down your pants (Line 6) 
- You undo your pants and begin to masturbate (Line 7) 
- As you reach the height of your arousal, a respected family member rushes into your 
room (Line 8) 
- They see you touching yourself, fully aroused (Line 9) 
- You feel your face turning red as you remember what is being portrayed on the 
computer screen (Line 10) 
- You quickly retract your hand from your genitals (Line 11) 
- The family member apologises and begins to leave (Line 12)  
- You worry over what the family member must think (Line 13) 
- You feel dirty and exposed (Line 14) 
- You don’t know how to face the family member again (Line 15) 
 
 
Bedroom (control) 
- You are in your bedroom, alone (Line 1) 
- You turn on your computer and begin to look through websites (Line 2) 
- You notice an advert for a site showing cheap flights (Line 3) 
- You notice yourself getting excited about its content (Line 4) 
- You become more interested in the site as your excitement increases (Line 5) 
- Soon you want to begin looking at flight options (Line 6) 
- You open the website and begin browsing (Line 7) 
- As you’re getting more excited about possibilities for a trip, a respected family 
member rushes into your room (Line 8) 
- They see you smiling with enthusiasm (Line 9) 
- You feel like telling them about the cheap flights you’ve found, as they see what’s on 
the screen (Line 10) 
- You quickly click on the icon for more flights (Line 11) 
- The family member shares your excitement (Line 12) 
- You get the impression they are also thinking about taking a trip (Line 13) 
- You feel curious about their favourite destinations (Line 14) 
- You feel good sharing the idea with your family member (Line 15) 
 
